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ABSTRACT
SIDE EFFECTS OF SELF-REFERENTIAL DISCUSSION: THE IMPACT AND
INTERACTION OF DEDUCTIVE AND INDUCTIVE ROUTES OF IDENTITY

Chandler MacSwain B.A.
Marquette University, 2019

Studies of group communication and group identity rest on two competing
theoretical concepts of the group, one that prioritizes examining the relationships between
members and one that examines the group as a gestalt construct. For live groups, it is not
always clear which style, individual or gestalt, is most appropriate or provides more
insight into any specific group because groups’ identities and communication behaviors
are sometimes explicable by both theoretical concepts. This occurs because in real-world
groups the formation process typically involves an amalgamation of both influences. In
other words, live groups form identities built around both members’ individual traits and
categorical commonalities among members. When group formation occurs, it is not
always clear which theoretical concept should guide the analysis because when both
identity formation styles occur together, research currently lacks a way to determine
which has more influence on the resulting group. The present study brings our
theoretical understanding of group formation closer to groups in a live context. It does so
by forming groups under conditions that provide opportunities to foster both formation
styles and measuring members’ perception of gestalt or individually focal group identity.
Results indicate that members tended to perceive a greater degree of gestalt identity, but
not to the exclusion of individual identity.
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Introduction

The study of group communication has long been of interest to scholars (Allport,
1924; Hogg & Tindale, 2008; Haslam, Reicher, & Platow, 2011). The subject is
fascinating precisely because of the power the group holds. This power derives, in part,
from the social identities of the group, which stem from norms or the “regularities in
attitudes and behavior that characterize a social group and differentiate it from others”
(Hogg & Reid, 2006, p. 7). Social identities, then, are the features that separate one
group from another.
But social identities do not exist in a vacuum. Social groups with shared features
of social identities can be different from one another depending on the context. For
example, it is readily apparent what specific regularities of behavior differentiate a
baseball and football team from one another (for a start, merely by looking at the number
of players on the field). Yet the casual observer cannot readily distinguish two baseball
teams in the same fashion. Of course, a dedicated fan could supply reams of information
differentiating two baseball teams from player statistics to club history. Indeed, even the
manner in which a dedicated fan communicates about a team differs based on the team’s
social identity. Fans of the New York Yankees can both recognize Babe Ruth and recall
the legends of his title winning years while fans of other teams may only recognize the
name without knowing the Yankee’s teams of the era as well as they know their own
championship teams.
The question, then, is what level of analysis carries the greatest import. In other
words, if social identities are the distinguishing features of groups, which aspect of social
identity has the most distinguishing influence? To continue the baseball metaphor, when
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we think of a particular franchise do we consider the club’s defining accomplishments
and culture or do we think of the star players?
Rather than beginning the inquiry with groups that carry excessive amounts of
preexisting historical context for their social identities (the official rulebook of the MLB
is 184 pages long (Lepperd, 2018), and these are merely the shared aspects of identity
among baseball teams in one league!) this question is best answered using novel groups.
Of course, the earlier example regarding baseball teams should suggest the obvious
conclusion; fans dip into both the club’s shared accomplishments and individual player’s
achievements to distinguish their team from another. In other words, for real world
groups, no separation exists between these two concepts. In contrast, however,
researchers often differentiate between the two because of difficulties in conducting both
analyses simultaneously and disagreements over how these two influences interact, or
which one is more important in situ (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Koudenburg,
Postmes, & Gordijn, 2017; Koudenburg, Postmes, Gordijn, & Van Mourik Brokeman,
2015).
There are multiple methods of studying small groups, all predicated on different
theoretical answers to this question of dominant context. From the multitude of theories,
two major trends emerge. In the first, scholars examine individuals as the referent for the
group. In the second, scholars conceptualize the group as the dominant entity, one
separate from the individuals within. This paper explores both traditions.
However, these parallel traditions extend to more aspects of group study than
merely differences over the referent. In a trickledown effect, these influences extend to
the analysis of the group. In sum, when asked to determine what distinguishes two
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baseball teams some researchers would begin by looking at the individual players and
other researchers would begin by looking at the team’s gestalt identity.
Of course, the problem of preexisting groups is a pervasive one. Even groups as
simple as a baseball team have extensive histories that render such evaluation prohibitive.
Researchers work around this problem by creating novel groups, one of the problems
with this approach being that depending on the theory used to study the group,
researchers will construct the group based on either individual traits or shared culture.
This division in creation prompts division in results, because researchers in each camp
examine different aspects of the group.
In contrast, the present project aims to create a group created through both means,
by individual and shared traits. This creation style offers a unique advantage. By priming
both individual and gestalt traits this process allows observation of how each trait then
influences the group. The resulting group then presents a viable means of examining
how these two styles impact and interact with one another in groups. Observation of this
interaction in a laboratory group gives insight into the same impact and interaction in a
live group because like a live group it contains both influences. Accordingly, this method
demonstrates individual and gestalt is a better descriptive measure of a real-world group.
The goal, therefore, is to gain insight into the nature of groups in situ.
The best strategy to gain this insight into the interaction of these two formation
styles is the study of group members. Members in groups formed around gestalt
identities versus groups formed around individual traits communicate within the group
differently and perceive their groups differently. When shared affiliations on a gestalt
level define the group, members focus on the similarities they have with one another. In
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contrast, when a group forms around members’ individuality, members focus on the
differences they have with one another.
As such, the literature review not only explores various theoretical approaches to
the group but the theoretical approaches to how group members communicate and
interact within the group. Understanding the behavior of members in situ provides
critical insight into the nature of groups and provides a method of determining the
dominant influence, either the gestalt or the individual, on a group’s identity.
Review of the Literature

To understand the role of social identity in the social group first demands a basic
understanding of the social group itself. Various definitions of group behavior and
communication, both aspects of the group, derive primarily from the different approaches
to the group. This paper explores how these parallel approaches define two kinds of
groups, those built around members and those built around shared categorical
associations. Further work on the subject of group identity discusses how to define
shared social cognition between group members and how group members interact with
those shared associations. Finally, this thesis explores a means of bridging this gap
through the social identity approach.
Historical Context for the Study of Groups

The study of groups today descends from two ideological roots (Vilanova, Beria,
Costa, & Koller, 2017). The first of these roots stems from Gustave Le Bon (1885) and
his work on the crowd. He argued that individuals in crowds were fundamentally
different from themselves when away from the crowd. The second root derives from the
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work of Floyd Allport (1924) who argued the polar opposite, maintaining that crowd
psychology was a fiction.
Le Bon’s crowd. Le Bon argued that the crowd represented a dangerous
influence that caused individuals to lose themselves in the power of the group. His ideas
centered on a submersion, or loss, of personal identity. The result of individuals coming
together, in Le Bon’s eyes, was a group of unthinking automata entirely at the mercy of
the often-insidious will of the crowd. The crowd itself was an almost unthinking entity,
more often the extension of a singular actor or conductor’s domineering desires (Le Bon,
1885).
Allport’s individual within the group. In the tradition of Floyd Allport (1924),
one approach to the study of groups is to maintain, “there is no psychology of groups
which is not essentially and entirely a psychology of individuals” (p. 4). Allport and
many contemporaries felt that if individuals learn from one another, then the group is a
collection of interpersonal relationships. Interpersonal communication, in this approach,
reveals the character of the group and it is unnecessary to make a theoretical shift from
the individual to the group analysis because “the individual in the crowd behaves just as
he would behave alone only more so” (Allport, 1924, p. 295).
Although Allport’s (1924) notion of the nonexistence of group psychology faded,
the persistent concept of a group as an individual phenomenon remained. In similar
fashion, Le Bon’s (1885) idea of the all-consuming crowd gave way to a more nuanced
understanding of crowd dynamics. The study of groups remained a topic of interest, but
in the wake of the Second World War, renewed interest in the group dynamics that gave
rise to Nazism encouraged a renaissance of interest in the study of groups.

6
Post-World War II. Interest in the power of groups to produce violent behavior
grew and the topic became an acute interest of scholars. While research did examine the
power of the group to produce positive behavior, high profile examples like the Stanford
Prison experiment, the Milgram shock tests, and the Asch conformity experiment
demonstrated the pervasive influence of the group and the ability of groups to push
people towards anti-social behavior. As a result, groups tended to hold an association
with negative behavior (Smith & Postmes, 2009; Hornsey, 2008; Wittenbaum &
Moreland 2008).
Modern study. Work over the past three decades takes a more balanced view.
Examples like groupthink, excessive polarization, and deindividuation all highlight the
potential for destructive and aggressive group behavior, but researchers studying these
topics all examine factors within groups that cause them (Reicher, 2001). Instead, many
of these negative examples derive from the power of groups’ social identities (Hogg &
Reid, 2006; Cialdini, Reno, & Kalgren, 1990). Contemporary research, in contrast to
previous study, emphasizes the dual and complex nature of the group, looking at positive
effects (Thomas, Smith, McGarty, & Postmes, 2015; Thomas, Mavor, & McGarty, 2012)
alongside the negative (Quandt & Festl, 2017).
Differences across disciplines. As the study of groups grew to be more nuanced
and attracted greater interest over the course of the post-World War II era differences in
approach developed between disciplines. Two primary disciplines, social psychology
and communication, are the most important to the study of groups today. While these
two fields are distinct, it is important to acknowledge, “communication is intrinsically
social-psychological, and communication phenomena have gained considerable traction
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in the social-psychological literature,” (Hornsey, Gallois, & Duck, 2008, p. 750).
Overlap, as a result, is expected.
The study of groups represents one such point of intersection. Some researchers
maintain that the study of groups is inherently interdisciplinary due to the extensive and
important nature of contributions from both sides (Forsyth, 2000, Forsyth & Burnette,
2005; Hornsey, et al., 2008; Hare, Borgatta, & Bales, 1955). But because this divide
exists, this paper gives an overview of the theories used to study groups. Further, it
demarcates some of the notable work from both disciplines and explores the differences
and similarities between the two in the study of groups.
Two Theoretical Approaches

Researchers tend to adhere to two primary traditional approaches to study of the
group. The first tradition treats the group as a collection of interpersonal relationships,
best understood through interpersonal principles generalized to the larger group (Keyton,
2006). The second is to treat the group as a distinct entity best understood as a gestalt
unit distinct from the participants, possessing some measure of its own force and power
that derives from the participation of the individuals that comprise it (Wittenbaum &
Moreland, 2008; Hornsey, 2008).
Groups as a collection of interpersonal relationships. Instead of beginning
with the concept of a group, some researchers prefer to work up from the interpersonal.
This tradition stems from the work of Floyd Allport (1924) who rejected the idea of a
group psychology and instead opted for the primacy of the individual. Over time,
Allport’s hardline stance faded but the core of his position remains influential. The
development of this line of thinking grew from the central tenet that interpersonal
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communication and group communication are intrinsically the same. As the
interpersonal is an extension of the personal, so too is the focal point of group study an
extension of the individual. This common theme ties together the theories of this section,
although they differ on the mechanisms that define the group and approaches to
examination of the individual’s relationship to the group.
Theories of social learning. The first set of theories that emphasize the
importance of the individual all conceptualize the group as a product of shared cognitive
processes. In other words, individuals interact with one another, form shared notions of
self and social identity, and those notions create the foundation of the group. Social
comparison, symbolic convergence, and optimal distinctiveness theories all attempt to
explain this winnowing of individual thought to group level experiences by looking at
interactions and how they create groups.
Social comparison theory. One of the first theoretical approaches to the power of
the group is social comparison theory. Social comparison theory argues that individuals
try to evaluate themselves through comparison to others (Festinger, 1954). Individuals
seek out others with similar views and attitudes to compare themselves to, and then they
evaluate themselves and modify behavior or beliefs accordingly (Festinger, 1954). Social
comparison theory elucidates the importance of interpersonal comparison and
individuals’ constant awareness of others.
Social psychologists tend to examine the individual side of social comparison
theory (Suls & Wheeler, 2012) by refining the theory (Tesser, 1988; Wheeler, Martin, &
Suls, 1997; Stapel, 2007), examining how individuals make comparisons (Wills, 1981;
Wheeler & Miyake, 1992; Crocker, Thompson, McGraw, & Ingerman, 1987), and
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determining the implications of those comparisons (Lyubomirsky, & Ross, 1997; Pahl,
Eiser, & White, 2009; Salovey & Rodin, 1984). While the group remains a component of
this focus, the emphasis often rests on how and why individuals choose to make specific
comparisons.
Communication researchers often overlap with these research aims, in fact a great
deal of work on social comparison theory falls along interdisciplinary lines. However,
communication literature typically examines different contexts and interactions that
facilitate comparisons (Ellison, Steinfeld, & Lampe, 2007; Sagioglou & Greitemeyer,
2014; Suls, 1977), and how those interactions then create the group (Barsade, 2002), or
influence members of groups (Bond, Fariss, Jones, Kramer, Marlow, Settle, & Fowler,
2012; Coviello, Sohn, Kramer, Marlow, Franceschetti, Christakis, & Fowler, 2014;
Hancock, Gee, Ciaccio, & Lin, 2008). The result of this interdisciplinary focus and
influence of the communication field is a great deal of emphasis on social networks and
the comparisons they elicit (Feinstein, Hershenberg, Bhatia, Latack, Meuwly, & Davila,
2013; Forest & Wood, 2012; Liu, Li Carcioppolo, & North, 2016; Haferkamp & Krämer,
2011; Ledbetter, Mazer, DeGroot, Meyer, Mao, & Swafford, 2011).
Symbolic convergence theory. Instead of looking at contrasts as a way of setting
up the barriers that define a group, symbolic convergence theory examines the shared
perceptions that create a group (Bormann, 1972; Bormann, Craan, & Shields, 1994).
Symbolic convergence occurs when individuals construct a shared fantasy, and this
shared cognitive understanding becomes the basis for the existence of the group. These
group fantasies are not mutual delusions, but rather a shared understanding of events,
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narratives surrounding the group, and the act of sharing stories. Convergence is the result
of a shared narrative, or the mutual interpretation that bonds members to the group.
Work on symbolic convergence belongs predominantly to the communication
discipline. Communication influences upon group communication include the
development of shared fantasies for political or public discourse (Bormann, 1982;
Goodnight & Poulakos, 1981), use of socialization in organizations (Bormann, 1983;
Cragan & Shields, 1981) and group formation (Bormann, 1986; Bormann, 1990; Cragan
& Wright, 1999). Symbolic convergence theory lends itself predominantly to live
settings (Kramer, 2011; Kramer, 2004; Zanin, Hoelscher, & Kramer, 2016). This is
because symbolic convergence is concerned with the rhetorical construction of fantasy
and not the specific features of the fantasy, although researchers often do examine case
studies and specific effects of a particular fantasy in situ (Darsey, 1995).
Optimal distinctiveness theory. In optimal distinctiveness theory, individuals
attempt to balance the level of conformity to the group with level of individuality, aiming
to attain an optimal level of distinctiveness (Brewer, 1991).
Research on optimal distinctiveness theory belongs primarily to the social
psychological discipline. While researchers across many disciplines and with interests
ranging from sports management (Andrijiw & Hyatt, 2009), public relations (Einwiller,
Laufer, Ruppel, 2017), celebrities (Guion, 2017), to marketing (Boley, Strzelecka, &
Watson, 2018) have all made use of optimal distinctiveness theory, the majority of the
work remains in the psychological field. The vast majority of this work concerns groups
of all kinds. Optimal distinctiveness applies to a wide range of group level phenomena
and researchers actively utilize it for many different purposes (Leonardelli, Pickett, &
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Brewer, 2010; Sedikides & Brewer, 2001; Leonardelli & Toh, 2015; Leonardelli &
Lewin Loyd, 2016).
Theories of the individual. The next set of theories almost ignores the
construction of the group. These theories primarily aim to explain behavior and social
interaction on the individual level. Researchers then must adapt the theories to group
communication, often with caveats. Sometimes this causes these theories to be less
popular than their group-minded counterparts are. However, social cognitive, uncertainty
reduction and cognitive dissonance theories all provide insight into the nature of groups
on the individual level.
Social cognitive theory. Social cognitive theory also presents a contrasting
viewpoint to the previous theories mentioned in this section. Social cognitive theory
argues that individuals learn through observation (Bandura, 1986; Bandura, 1977).
Bandura’s (1986) theory deals primarily with how and why individuals engage in social
learning. This typically operationalizes into studies of social agency, examining how
individuals utilize social networks (Bandura, 2001). Social cognitive theory, while aimed
primarily at explaining individual behaviors, demonstrates how groups can form around
member’s unified learning experiences.
Social cognitive theory is predominantly a psychology theory with less influence
on communication scholars than most other theories presented here. However,
communication researchers use social cognition in media contexts, for example television
(Joyce & Harwood, 2014), news (Appiah, Knobloch-Westerwick, & Alter, 2013),
selective exposure (Knobloch-Westerwick, & Hastall, 2010), social support (Guan & So,
2016), and message effectiveness (Marmo, 2013).
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In the context of groups, psychologists predominantly use social cognitive theory
to examine agency on the individual and interdependent level, examination on the
interdependent level often spirals into study of groups (Lee, Stajkovic, & Sergent, 2016;
Bandura, 2001). This often takes the form of studies on group performance, (Lichacz &
Partington, 1996), teams (Kozub & McDonnell, 2000), and self-efficacy (Bandura, 1999;
Bandura, 2000).
Cognitive dissonance theory. Cognitive dissonance theory argues that individuals
do not want an incongruity between thoughts and actions, and when confronted with
dissonance between the two, they modify accordingly (Festinger, 1957; Festinger, 1962;
Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959). This process is important for group communication
because some level of conflict may occur between the individual self and the social self
as people communicate within groups. The process of navigating that dissonance
provides some insight into the process by which individuals adhere to social values and
norms more over time.
Uncertainty reduction theory. Another theory that focuses on the individual level
of analysis is uncertainty reduction. Uncertainty reduction theory argues that individuals
are averse to uncertainty in interpersonal relationships and seek to reduce that uncertainty
whenever possible (Berger & Calabrese, 1975). The drive to reduce uncertainty in a
group often causes members to socialize in specific patterns. As a result, uncertainty
reduction sometimes finds itself paired with other theories or model of group behavior,
uncertainty reduction theory used to provide a motivation for individuals’ actions and the
companion theory used to provide a method of acting upon that motivation (Hogg &
Reid, 2006).
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Psychology uses uncertainty reduction to examine topics such as group attitudes
(Clarkson, Smith, Tormala, & Dugan, 2017) and mortality salience (Hohman & Hogg,
2017). Social psychologists often pair uncertainty reduction with social identity theory to
examine membership dynamics like affiliation (Hogg, 2000; Hogg & Mullin, 1999),
strength (Hohman, Gaffney, & Hogg, 2013), and adherence to group norms (Stein, Van
Kleef, Van Knippenberg, Hogg, Homan, & Moffitt, 2010). Uncertainty reduction is also
notably important to the study of organizations in social psychology (Loi, Chan, Lam,
2013; Boroş, Curşeu, & Miclea, 2011; Ashforth, Harrison, & Corley, 2008).
Communication scholars often utilize uncertainty reduction theory to explain and
develop an understanding of the socialization processes within small groups in the
context of organizations. Uncertainty reduction can describe initial and ongoing
socialization between members and group processes (Lester, 1987; Kramer, 1994;
Gallagher & Sias, 2009), information filtering (Ancona & Caldwell, 1992; Teboul, 1994),
volunteering (Douglas & Kim, 2013; McComb, 1995), downsizing (Johnson, Bernhagen,
Miller, & Allen, 1996; Kramer, 1993), and during transition periods (Kramer, &
Hoelscher, 2014; Kramer, Dougherty, & Pierce, 2004).
Social influence on the interpersonal level. A common theme of the preceding
theories is a focus on the social relationships of the individual, not the group.
Undeniably, some members of any group exert more or less influence than others do as
they rise to the status of leaders, or losing influence and fall to the status of outsiders.
Investigation into why this occurs involves the study of social influence, or the means
individuals use to gain influence over one another (Kelman, 1958).
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Social influence in small groups. Social influence is critical to small groups
because particularly influential individuals often have the ability to create their own
clusters of followers and eventually form groups through these methods, sometimes
unintentionally. This means studying how members obtain social influence is key to
understanding group dynamics. Theories and notable work in this tradition includes
social impact theory, Cialdini’s (2016) weapons of influence, and investigation into the
relational side of groups.
Social impact theory. Understanding the group’s influence in broad terms is the
domain of social impact theory. Social impact theory argues that influence stems from
strength, immediacy, and quantity of sources (Latané, 1981). These three factors
promote influence directly, and each describes ways influence grows based on features of
the communication of a norm (Hogg & Tindal, 2008; Latané, 1981).
Social impact theory is unique due to its strongly mathematical approach to
influence. As a result, it is often a choice for researchers attempting to model or simulate
live conditions (Tseng, Chen, Yu, & Wang, 2014; Nettle, 1999). This offers a great deal
of utility for researchers looking across disciplinary lines and for researchers looking at
specific phenomena.
In the realm of social psychology, inquiry into social impact theory in general
includes public speaking (Latané, Harkins, 1976; Jeffrey, & Latané, 1981), expanding the
theory itself (Nowak, Szamrej, & Latané, 1990), and persuasion (Latané & Wolf, 1981;
Wolf & Latané, 1983). In the context of groups, social psychologists utilize social
impact theory to describe bullying (Tseng, Chen, Yu, & Wang, 2014; Salmivalli,
Lagerspetz, & Björkqvist 1996; DeWall, Twenge, Bushman, Im, & Williams, 2010),
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social loafing (Williams, Harkins, & Latané, 1981), anxiety (Rapee & Heimberg, 1997),
and group influence (Latané, & Nida, 1979).
Communication researchers do not utilize social impact theory to the extent that
social psychologists do. A notable exception to this is in the domain of market research
and social media use. Communication scholars commonly use social impact theory to
examine both regular (Argo, Dahl, & Manchanda, 2005), and e-commerce (Kwahk, &
Ge, 2012; Mir, & Zaheer, 2012) alongside social media use (Perez-Vega, Waite, &
O'Gorman, 2016).
Cialdini’s weapons of influence. Cialdini (2009; 2016) defines specific routes to
social influence known as the weapons of influence. He defines seven means to
obtaining influence. These routes allow individuals to exert influence upon another
through use of various psychological tactics. These seven principles are reciprocity,
commitment, social proof, authority, liking, scarcity, and unity (Cialdini, 2009; 2016).
Cialdini’s (2016) work is, much like social impact theory, notably
interdisciplinary in fields outside of social psychology and communication. Scholars in
law (Davidov, & Davidov, 2013; Guthrie, 2004; Hughes, 2016; Cialdini, Wissler, &
Schweitzer, 2003), cybersecurity (Stajano, Wilson, 2011; Rosenthal, 2014; Oliveira,
Rocha, Yang, Ellis, Dommaraju, Muradoglu, Weir, Soliman, Lin, & Ebner, 2017), and
design (Lockton, Harrison, & Stanton, 2008; Gkika, & Lekakos, 2014) all make use of
the weapons of influence, often in a cross-department and collaborative context (Kaptein,
Nass, Parvinen, & Markopoulos, 2013).
Psychologists, generally, are more concerned with developing a full
understanding of the weapons themselves. They examine the mechanisms (Burger,
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Messian, Patel, Del, & Anderson, 2004; Bornstein, 1989), conditions (Guadagno, Okdie,
& Muscanell, 2013; Muscanell, Guadagno, & Murphy, 2014), and social or personal
traits (Gudjonssona, Sigurdsson, Einarsson, & Einarsson, 2008; Guadagno, & Cialdini,
2002; Guadagno, & Cialdini, 2007) that allow these weapons to function and affect the
group. Broadly, psychologists seek to expand the understanding of the weapons
themselves, in particular how and why they function.
In contrast, communication scholars focus more on the operationalization of these
weapons in real life. Again, cross-disciplinary efforts are common (Goldstein, Cialdini,
& Griskevicius, 2008) because operationalized contexts are just as rich a medium to
satisfy both the needs of social psychologists and communication researchers. Notably,
however, the communication field does much more work to use the weapons in specific,
rather than general, contexts such as campaigns (Perloff, 2017), online networks
(Metzger, Flanagin, & Medders, 2010), advertising (Freling, & Dacin, 2010), and
relationships (Boster, Shaw, Hughes, Kotowski, Strom, & Deatrick, 2009).
Relational groups. Some groups such as sororities and fraternities exist to
facilitate relationships among members. Researchers sometimes refer to work in this
vein as relational or expressive group communication (Keyton, 2000). The study of
relational groups is predominantly the domain of communication scholars, although
cross-disciplinary efforts do exist (see Wittenbaum, Hubbell, & Zuckerman, 1999).
The goal of this approach is to examine how individual relationships between
members create and in turn affect a group (Keyton, 2006). Research interests vary
because relational groups present a wide variety of subjects. Some group level interests
include tension between personal and group values (Alavi, & McCormick, 2007; Crown,

17
2007; Jehn, 1994), distribution of information (Wittenbaum, Hollingshead, & Botero,
2004; Hollingshead, Jacobsohn, & Beck, 2007; van Swol, 2009), member’s conflicting
goals (Barnes, & Keleher, 2006; Brodbeck, Kerschreiter, Mojzisch, & Schulz-Hardt,
2007), and within-group conflict resolution (Schweiger, & Sandberg, 1989). On an
individual level, researchers examine leadership (Barge, & Hirokawa, 1989; Wittenbaum,
2000), ostracizing (Wittenbaum, 1998; Wittenbaum & Bowman, 2004), and the
convergence of both group and interpersonal influences (Ervin, Bonito, & Keyton, 2017).
The study of relational groups involves a great deal of examination of specific
communication behaviors and as such, there is a diversity in approaches both theoretical
and methodological. The unifying theme however is the underlying emphasis and focus
of the studies themselves.
Interpersonal themes in the study of groups. The common thread of the above
perspectives is that interpersonal interactions generalize to group interactions. As a
result, the social influence exerted by an individual appears in a group setting by simply
increasing the number of recipients. In turn, the observation components of social
learning theories generalize as well, learning occurs as many individuals observe and
transmit together, i.e. instead of observing the actions of a single other, the individual
observes the actions of many others. Like a spider web, the group develops out of
strands, each strand a single interpersonal interaction that overlaps and ties together until
it forms a whole. Therefore, the group begins and ends with the perspective of the
individual and at no point does any kind of distinct entity that makes up ‘the group’
appear as a component of observation because ‘the group’ is the sum of these interactions
not the source.
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Social influence and the role of interpersonal relationships in defining the group is
one piece of the literature on the study of groups. Other researchers examine groups as a
whole unit, neither wholly separate from the individual nor wholly related.
Gestalt groups. In contrast to Allport (1924) and his individually focused group
psychology, Le Bon (1885) argued that the crowd constituted a fundamental rejection of
individual psychology. Later scientists interested in Le Bon’s ideas such as Festinger,
Pepitone, and Newcomb (1952) as well as Zimbardo (1969; 1971), developed this
tradition. They argued that crowds represented a loss of individual identity and an
immersion into a unique environment with its own set of theoretical rules, behaviors, and
identities. As a result, many approaches to group behavior examine the group as a
conceptual unit distinct from any individual members, essentially treating the group as a
gestalt unit in itself. In this area, groups tend to appear as a set of processes aimed at
different goals.
Forsyth’s features of groups. The gestalt approach to group development
remains rooted in the idea that groups have different features that rise above the
individual level. Forsyth (2014) defines those features as interactions, goals,
interdependence, structure, and cohesion. Each of these features allows for examination
of different aspects of the group, all aimed at developing an understanding of how the
group functions as a unit. The most common kind of analysis on this level is with phase
models.
Phase models. Among the earliest attempts to explain group behavior are phase
models, or models that describe the different points in the lifecycle of the group (Frey,
Gouran, & Poole, 1999). Phase models generally come from a communication research
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agenda because they are concerned primarily with the specific communication acts
occurring within a group. However, organizational psychology exhibits a similar interest
in phase models, although their efforts are relatively unique within the field of
psychology (Levine, & Moreland, 1990; Guzzo, & Dickson, 1996; Sanna, & Parks, 1997;
Ilgen, Hollenbeck, Johnson, & Jundt, 2005).
Unlike the previous sections, the paper does not provide an accompanying
introduction to the usage of the theory in different research fields. This is because phase
models generally have limited variance in use from one field to the next. Broadly,
researchers regardless of discipline, either test, refine, or apply phase models to situations
or simulations in an attempt to develop a clearer understanding of how groups behave
(Forsyth & Burnette, 2005). The collaboration and overlap between organizational
psychologists and the communication field (Hornsey et al., 2008) only increases the
degree of similarity. While psychology and communication scholars are likely to create
different kinds of phase models with emphasis on different aspects and processes, the
overall goal is the same, to describe the phases of phenomena related to groups.
There are two general kinds of phase models. The first attempts to describe broad
group processes that every group must go through irrespective of the specific nature of
the group. The second kind of phase model attempts to describe the phases a group
should adhere to in order to accomplish a specific goal or those that accompany a specific
phenomenon, these are goal oriented phase models. Exemplars of the first kind of phase
models are Tuckman’s (1965) model and the multiple sequences model. Archetypal
examples of the second are interaction process analysis, functional group communication
theory, and the interact system model of decision emergence.
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Tuckman’s model. Among the first conceptualizations of the group is the
norming-forming-storming-performing model of group development (Tuckman, 1965).
This model looks at the different stages of group development, examining the various
actions groups take throughout their lifecycle. Although today the model includes more
stages, it broadly defines the various stages of development groups go through as they
grow and eventually disperse (Tuckman, 1965; Tuckman & Jensen, 1977).
Tuckman’s (1965) model is particularly remarkable for its broad applicability and
robustness (Keyton, 2006; Frey, 1996). These traits lead to widespread use of Tuckman’s
model outside the communication and social psychology fields. Researchers studying
human resources (Bonebright, 2010), nursing (Natvig & Stark, 2016), and gaming
(Buchan, & Taylor, 2016) have all used the norming-forming-storming model.
The multiple sequences model. Another archetypal framework in the phase model
tradition is the multiple-sequences model, which argues group communication does not
occur in sequential steps. Rather, it occurs in tracks that groups can switch between as
needed (Poole, 1983; Poole & Roth, 1989a; Poole & Roth 1989b). Poole (1983) defines
four tracks: (a) task, (b) relation, (c) topic, and (d) breakpoints. In contrast to Tuckman,
these tracks can all occur at different points without a set, or expected, pattern. Poole
(1983) argues that groups respond to specific needs that arise during processes,
Goal oriented phase models. The antecedent of many phase models is Bales’
(1950) interaction process analysis, which classifies different communicative acts within
groups in terms of their relationship to group tasks. Theories and phase models born
from this historical root often classified by researchers as the outcome-oriented approach
as a result (Bales & Strodbeck, 1951; Frey, 1996).
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The second goal oriented phase model is the interact system model of decision
emergence. The interact model defines four stages of decision-making, orientation,
conflict, emergence, and reinforcement (Fisher, 1970; Fisher & Hawes, 1971). Fisher’s
(1970) creation offers an important bridge between the broad phase models and the more
focused descendants because it offers a broad approach to a wide problem, while
simultaneously acknowledging that the model has limitations and does not describe every
group.
The last, functional group communication theory, blurs the line between phase
model and theory as it examines how group communication acts and features relate to
task performance and quality of decision-making (Gouran & Hirokawa 1996).
Functional group communication theory analyzes the features of communication in lieu
of the communicative act itself, concerning itself with the purpose and use of
communication within the group, constructing certain features that contribute to effective
decision-making (Hirokawa, 1983).
The goal of these perspectives from Tuckman (1965) and Poole (1983) to Bales
(1950), Fisher (1970), and Gouran and Hirokawa (1996) is to examine the broad phases
of group interactions and the resulting collective behaviors. This paper focuses on one
particular phase, norm formation.
Using the Two Approaches Together

The two styles of the previous section define, broadly, two overarching ways of
approaching the study of groups. These two theoretical approaches are both appropriate,
albeit in different contexts. It is entirely appropriate to examine the same group using
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different means from different traditions. In many ways, this unified approach can be
complimentary.
For example, when examining a professional baseball team a researcher might
observe team meetings and examine the stages they undergo during these meetings using
functional group communication theory. But they might also study the team’s season
long goal of winning a championship as a component of the shared fantasy from
symbolic convergence theory. In similar fashion, they might examine how new players
from a mid-season trade acclimatize to the new team using uncertainty reduction and in
turn how the captain leads using Cialdini’s (2016) weapons of influence. While such a
work would be immense, it would extensively document how the group functions.
Unfortunately, due to the scale of such an undertaking, it is often unfeasible and/or
impractical, not to mention the other concerns such a study would raise.
As a result, pragmatism and accuracy both demand a degree of discretion when it
comes to picking theories to apply. The question this raises is if a research team did
manage to collect all that information about a baseball team, which piece or pieces of
evidence would then give the best picture of the group. In reality, depending on the aims
of the study, this answer is likely to be different. But even studies with similar aims can
differ on methodology.
Imagine a group of researchers, each intending to examine the same baseball
team, trying to resolve a dispute about which theory to use. Arguably, the first camp
might say, the most important part of the team is why it exists in the first place, which is
to win championships. The answer then would stem from symbolic convergence’s
shared fantasy. But another part of the research team might counter that how the group
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goes about achieving this goal matters more, in which case functional group
communication theory would be a better fit. Still another group of researchers might
protest that while most people remember Babe Ruth, far fewer can name the rest of the
lineup from the ’27 Yankees, in other words, leadership is the most salient feature of the
group.
The question then, is which overarching tradition should guide an investigation.
Drilling down to which theory is likely to rest more on the specific aims of the study, but
because researchers still need to know where to start investigating it is important to
develop a deeper understanding of the assumptions underlying theories from both
traditions. Critically, however, groups are not homogenously distributed. In other words,
the best theory to describe several different groups may be several different theories. The
goal, then, cannot simply be to find a universally better theoretical approach.
Going back to the example of the study of a baseball team, each part of the
research team applied various theories, and depending on the aims of the study, each one
provided a correct answer. Building off that, instead of trying to find a catch all
theoretical answer, the goal of this paper is to provide information to inform the decisions
regarding what theories to use when studying groups. In other words, if the question is
how best to describe the baseball team, this paper aims to demonstrate some of the
features of the team researchers can examine to help inform decisions about theories to
use and consult when answering that question.
This is, of course, a larger goal than any single study can adequately hope to
address. This paper is not the definitive statement on the subject, but rather a careful first
step. It does not provide a framework that allows, in most cases, for the selection of a
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specific theory. It aims to examine certain salient differences between groups best
described by theories within the gestalt tradition versus groups best described by theories
within the individualistic tradition.
This study does so by asking the following research question: To what extent does
social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to an increase in the
salience of a heterogeneous or homogeneous social identity for groups that experience
deindividuation compared to those that do not?
Unpacking this question requires first an understanding of social identity creation,
then an exploration of the mechanics of social identity salience, and finally
deindividuation. Along the way, this paper defines self-referential discussion and
introduces the social identity approach as a way of tying all these disparate pieces
together. The social identity approach focuses on two theories of groups unexplored in
the preceding sections. The reason this paper introduces the social identity approach later
is because unlike the preceding theories, the social identity approach is concerned with
the mechanics underlying the creation of social groups and as a result is uniquely
appropriate to bridging the gap between social identity formation and a group’s resulting
social identity.
Defining Key Terms

The question introduced in the previous section comes with quite a few terms.
Unpacking those terms is critical to understanding the question. As such, this section
provides a broad overview of some of these terms. For some, extensive sections in the
later parts of the paper detail these terms and the associated research in more detail. For
them, in essence, this section provides a preview that gives enough information to set the
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stage for the latter sections that provide research context and expansions of the original
concepts introduced here. This section covers these key terms in the order they appear in
the question, social identity formation first and deindividuation last.
Social identity formation. Social identity formation generally encompasses
everything a group does to create a social identity, ranging from overt efforts to define
the group as a whole too subtle and often silent regulatory behaviors (Turner et al., 1987).
In this paper, social identity formation utilizes a wide definition because in many ways
every interaction within a group setting and in some cases the lack of certain interactions,
helps to define the group in the minds of the members. Especially because this paper
discusses the two approaches to the study of groups, it encapsulates a broad framework
for social identity formation because each approach studies this aspect of the group
differently.
Self-referential discussion. Sometimes referred to as ‘meta-discussion’ this is
any kind of discussion where the topic is the group itself. In this paper, self-referential
discussion is simply a winnowed down version of social identity formation. In order to
control certain variables, this paper restricts social identity formation in the small groups
created to specific contexts. Self-referential discussion is nothing more than a convenient
way of demarcating the difference between unrestricted interaction and the discussion
that occurs specifically in this paper.
Heterogeneous and homogeneous identity. Heterogeneous and homogeneous
social identity refers to the extent to which an individual member of the group perceives
themselves as either a heterogeneous or homogeneous member of the group. Some
groups form around shared traits and affiliations while others form around individual
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contributions, but in situ groups can present both options at once (Postmes, Haslam, &
Swaab, 2005). For example, while a pitcher plays a different role on a team than a
catcher, they are both members of the overall team. A player can view themselves as
either a team member or an extension of the role they hold in the team, in the first case
emphasizing their homogeneity towards other members of the group and in the second
emphasizing their heterogeneity.
Deindividuation. Deindividuation is a specific kind of social identity
phenomena. In certain cases, an individual’s social identity becomes critically important
due to manipulations of the relative differences among members of a category (Reicher et
al., 1995). Deindividuation is a powerful state of heightened social identification that
makes identifying and associating behavior with a particular group much easier.
Social Identity Creation

When creating a social identity, norms form the basis for the new identity.
Initially, norms and social identities are non-distinct, in other words the accepted social
norms are the social identity of the group. Once norming gives rise to a social identity, a
group exists.
The importance of social identities. A common theme throughout group
research is the influence of the group. Reicher Spears, and Postmes (1995) write, “there
is no generic group effect,” (p. 173). They argue that groups do not have any automatic
features, and the power of the group stems directly from the characteristics of the group.
In other words, groups’ social identities provide key insight into the behavior of groups
and the behavior of individuals with group affiliations. Social identity creation is an
important part of both interpersonal and gestalt perspectives (Hogg & Tindale, 2008). As
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a result, when examining group behavior it becomes critically important to study the
formation, content, and effects of various aspects of the social identity.
The role of social norms. Norms are the foundation of social identities and the
application of a social identity in a situation. For example, a group of friends playing a
pickup game might decide to emulate their favorite player, who is brash and outspoken.
In turn, they act brash and outspoken. The team would also develop other norms, such as
wearing helmets when batting. Each of these is a component of the overall social identity
of the baseball team. Within groups, social norms not only create the basis of social
identities, they aid in the formation of social identities. No matter how new a player is,
they can quickly grasp simply norms like wearing a helmet that contribute to their new
social identity.
Two classification schemes for norms. Researchers generally categorize norms
in two ways (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Hogg & Reid, 2006). The first focuses
on content and the second focuses on codification. When looking at content, researchers
tend to categorize norms by what meaning they convey to the group. This perspective
examines the impact norms have from the perspective of what specific behaviors they
encourage or discourage. When looking at codification, researchers tend to look at the
formation of norms. This perspective examines the impact of formation on the norm
itself, examining the various routes groups take to create norms and the various means
they use to communicate or enforce those norms.
The content of norms. Content norms tend to sort into various classification
schemes. Engleberg and Wynn (2013) propose one such scheme where norms focus on
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interaction, procedure, status, or achievement. These four classifications broadly define
norms by how the group uses them to define and inform behavior.
This classification scheme is specific to the role of the norm itself, examining how
members of the group utilize the norm. Other classification schemes examine the
typology of the norm, arguing that norms fall along continua. The focus theory of
normative conduct lays out broad continua that describe the role of the norm (Cialdini et
al., 1990).
The codification of norms. Analysis of the codification of norms tends to look at
the ways in which groups convey or demarcate norms. Engleberg and Wynn (2013)
again propose two broad categories of formation: implicit and explicit. Implicit norms
refer to norms that group members have not formally agreed upon while explicit norms
refer to those upon which group members have formally agreed.
Individuals’ active interaction with both form and content of norms.

Individuals cannot adhere rigidly to every norm they encounter. Some social identities

carry contradictory or poorly understood norms and in those cases, individuals must

decide which norm to follow or how rigidly to adhere to the norm. Especially in cases

where form and content contradict one another, individuals face a choice as to how they

will interact with the norm.

Returning to the baseball team, it is extremely common for coaches, managers, or
players to argue with the decision of the umpire during a game, yet the norms would
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suggest that this argument is taboo because rulebooks carry punishments for such an
activity (Lepperd, 2018). These arguments stem from two kinds of normative
disagreement, first a disagreement over the codified rule, and second a disagreement over
the injunctive rule against questioning the umpire’s authority during a game.
As the example demonstrates, individuals are always negotiating the importance
of norms. In context, if a manager must decide on the appropriateness of arguing a call,
they must weigh the form of the norm (is the manner in which they want to voice their
disagreement appropriate?) and the content of the norm (was the umpire’s call
incorrect?). In situ, these rules act as a check and balance against one another. In a
broader sense, explicit and active negotiation of norms occurs every day. Individuals
openly weigh different norms and decide the appropriate level of adherence and
punishment for deviation. Groups develop different methods of solving these normative
disputes and in turn, this aids in the creation of a gestalt social identity (Hogg & Reid,
2006; Smith & Postmes, 2011).
The source of social norms. The formation of a social identity begins with the
development of social norms. Over time, norms become social identities. Postmes,
Haslam, & Swaab (2005) argue that social identities and norms appear through either an
inductive process or a deductive process. In this model, termed the interactive model of
social identity formation (IMSIF), social identities stem from two sources, inductive and
deductive. Deductive identity formation involves top-down group comparisons. This
occurs when members of a novel group examine the superordinate groups to which they
belong. The group is then a gestalt construct with the common bond of identity centered
on a clear prototype.
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Alternatively, social identities come from an inductive approach. Inductive
formation grows from group members’ interactions. Inductive creation of a group’s
identity is a bottom-up process in which interaction defines the group. Members
negotiate individual norms and components of the social identity piecemeal until they
reach a consolidated social identity (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). In this case, the
group is a heterogeneous construct with the common bond of identity centered on
member’s personal identities.
Both of these approaches emphasize the relative importance of examining the way
social identities appear, because an examination of the identity formation process reveals
characteristics about the future of the social identity. The source of formation is
important to discerning how the identity functions and how individuals perceive the
components of the identity. For example, in a later study, Postmes, Spears, Lee, and
Novak (2005) demonstrated that utilizing a deductive or inductive route to social identity
formation has consequences for the social acceptability of adherence to specific norms
within the umbrella of a social identity.
The influence of social identities on behavior. People are social animals. They
base decisions on considerations of multiple social contexts, often overlapping. Yet
groups do not remain static. The social identity of a political party a year after its
inception is likely to be different from its identity ten or fifty years later. While
occasionally outside influences change a social identity (for example a political party
created to advocate for one issue that then succeeds in promoting that issue), by and large
changes in a social identity over time stem from the group members applying different
interpretations, standards, and regulation techniques to aspects of the social identity.
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The existence of this shift, however, is important to understanding how a social
identity influences behavior. Individuals do not rigidly conform to a social identity, and
their behavior reflects this. Various theories exist to explain why social identities gain or
lose salience for individuals. Some examine how individuals interact with social
identities (Cialdini, Reno, & Kalgren, 1990; Ajzen, 1985; Ajzen, 1991; Ajzen, 2002),
while others examine the role of identity from the group level (Turner & Killian, 1987;
Tajfel & Turner, 1979). This paper utilizes the social identity approach because, while it
stems from the group level of analysis, it offers the ability to bridge the gap using models
built off its theoretical framework.
The Social Identity Approach

The social identity approach consists of two theories, social identity theory and
self-categorization theory. Together, these theories provide an explanation for the
importance of social groups as a component of social identity and the power of the group.
Social identity theory. The first of these two is social identity theory. Social
identity theory rests on two central ideas. First, when members join and accept a group
they determine the meaning of the group through comparison to the relevant out-group.
Second, members try to define the in-group they belong to positively, especially in
relation to the out-group. People do not want to join inferior groups and seek to enhance
the prestige of the ones to which they do belong.
Tajfel and Turner (1979) point out that this competition is not an endpoint, but a
beginning to understanding the process of group behavior and individual behavior in
relation to the social category. Intergroup conflict and individual behavior stem in part
from the social realities individuals find themselves tied to, but these issues are
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contextually dependent. Groups with negative associations do not always engage in
competition with another group to enhance the prestige of their own, members may
defect from the group, reframe defects as positive attributes, or claim other positive
attributes (Haslam et al., 2011; Ellemers, Spears, & Doosje, 1999; Reicher & Haslam,
2006). All of these functions are relational. They shift depending on the relevant outgroup in comparison.
Critically, social identity theory also advances that when social identities are
salient, individuals operate at the group level when considering issues of identity. The
group becomes a marker of the individual’s power and importance.
Salience of social identity. Social identity theory advances that social and
personal identities are at odds. When one gains salience, the other loses salience (Turner,
Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). A person is either an individual or a member
of a group.
However, while most groups operate cleanly on this spectrum, it is possible to
create groups that emphasize individual identity salience as a component of the group’s
identity (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). The inductive route to social identity
formation from the model discussed earlier argues that an inductive route to formation
rests on the contributions of individual members. As a result, under specific conditions
individuals may join a group that grants them a great deal of freedom to express
individual identity and even find that the group celebrates individual identity. Notably,
the inductive group does not sidestep the antagonism of social and personal identity.
Rather, it redefines what is salient in a given context and what that salience means for the
group.

33
Self-categorization theory. Social identity theory raises the point that
individuals must accept a group membership before the effects appear. The shift in
mental processes from thinking about the self to thinking about the group that causes the
activation of group behavioral patterns (Turner, 1982). This shift from the self to the
group is depersonalization.
Depersonalization. Depersonalization refers to the specific point when an
individual begins to refer to himself or herself as a social identity first, personal identity
second (Turner et al., 1987). For example, John Doe is a member of the police. When on
duty, he introduces himself as a police officer and is depersonalized. When off duty, he
introduces himself as John Doe and is not depersonalized. Notably, this is an individual’s
decision to self-categorize a social identity over a personal one. Depersonalization
reflects another concept, self-stereotyping.
Self-stereotyping. When individuals depersonalize themselves, they are selfstereotyping. This refers to moments where a social identity or membership causes
individuals to engage in behavior typical of that social identity (Turner et al., 1987).
Self-stereotyping changes individual’s immediate norms and social values. Haslam,
Reicher, and Platow (2011) give the example of a churchgoer who then attends a football
game, “in church the person may be (and want to be) meek and mild; at the game he or
she may be (and may want to be) rowdy and raucous” (p. 53). Depersonalization and
self-stereotyping change how the individual relates to the world and how the world
relates to the individual, they shift the perspective from the individual’s identity to their
salient group identity.
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Still, neither of these processes answers why any specific action falls into the
purview of one group or another. In context, neither answers why it is not normative for
the churchgoer to act rowdy and raucous or the football fan to act meek and mild.
Further, neither self-stereotyping nor depersonalization answers why a specific identity
gains salience at any point over another.
Comparative and normative fit. Identities gain salience in two ways,
comparative and normative fit. Normative fit deals with the content of the group
member’s actions. Group members must do what other members expect of them in
context. The churchgoers who appear in football face paint sporting a foam finger is
unlikely to activate any kind of depersonalization in themselves and other members of the
group are unlikely to treat them as a group member.
Comparative fit deals with the principle of meta-contrast, which essentially states
that groups find distinctions through differences (Haslam et al., 2011). Groups want to
have little difference between members of a category and great differences between
categories, in other words the football fans should seek to emphasize the intergroup
differences between their team and another and seek to emphasize the intragroup unity of
their own team. Comparative fit also informs the position that best defines the group or
the prototype
Prototypes. The prototype is the shared understanding of the ‘ideal’ group
member. Critically, the prototypical member is not the average member. Further, the
prototypical member of a group changes depending on the relevant, salient, out-group
(Turner et al., 1987). For example, Hopkins, Regan, and Abell (1997) demonstrate that
the national identity of the Scottish changed in comparison to other national identities. A
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prototypical member of a group depends on the stance of the out-group, and typically
shifts further away from the out-group.
Further, within the social identity approach, prototypicality has implications for
social desirability and influence. The higher an individual’s prototypicality, the more
favorable others tend to evaluate them in contexts where high prototypicality is desirable
(Haslam et al., 2011).
Social Identity Formation and Salience

The social identity approach offers a means of examining norms through an
important pair of models. The first of these is the social identity model of
deindividuation effects (SIDE), which offers a unique means of forcing identity salience
to the forefront (Reicher et al., 1995). Through use of deindividuation manipulations
with expectations guided by SIDE, it is possible to observe long-term effects deriving
from differences in norm formation.
The second model, the interactive model of social identity formation (IMSIF)
offers a means of examining norm formation through the same lens as deindividuation,
providing a unified theoretical basis for expectations regarding outcomes (Jans, Postmes,
& Van der Zee, 2012). Further, and more importantly, IMSIF offers a coherent look at
two kinds of groups, both of which draw interest specifically because they offer a means
of bridging the gaps this paper previously highlighted in exploration of theories on
norms.
Finally, IMSIF answers a critical gap within the social identity approach itself,
giving the theories a means of examining groups that form in the much more
decentralized fashion of the early theoretical approaches to the group. In sum, while
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IMSIF maintains the understanding of social behavior elucidated by the social identity
approach, it also offers insight into groups where members take central stage (Postmes,
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Postmes, Spears et al., 2005). IMSIF cannot, however, narrow
and control the parameters of group formation. In fact, it does almost the opposite,
allowing for the combination of both formation styles. To limit the number of extraneous
variables and exert control over the formation process, computer-mediated
communication is introduced.
Computer-Mediated Communication

Computers introduce complications into the natural socialization process of
groups that would suggest decreased opportunity for the natural formation of groups in
both perspectives. Yet CMC also increases polarization, which indicates a shifting group
prototype and, necessarily, the presence of a group (Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1980;
Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1982; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). In particular, the
introduction and widespread commonality of anonymity in computer-mediated
communication (CMC) represents a complication to the study of group behavior because
of the way that it interacts with social identities. This section introduces some early
model based approaches to CMC as well as the influential deindividuation theory before
exploring contemporary research interests and introducing the social identity model of
deindividuation effects (SIDE) as a means of exploring anonymity within the umbrella of
the social identity approach.
Why computer-mediated communication? Before discussing the features of
CMC, this section provides rationale for the use of CMC. Observation of the mechanics
of group formation is difficult simply because the salience of group membership
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constantly shifts. Even if a social identity is active, the specific social identity itself may
change at a moment’s notice. For example, if a group of friends gathers to play baseball
they may adopt the social identity of their team. But in the event of an injury, a member
who works as a doctor is likely to adopt that social identity at the expense of their team’s
identity. One method of ensuring that this does not occur is the use of a deindividuation
manipulation, something that increases the salience of a particular social identity. This
increased salience ensures that member’s behavior and communication stems from their
social identities.
This inquiry, because of the relative frequency and ease of creating reliable
deindividuation manipulations in CMC (Lea & Spears, 1991; Reicher et al., 1995),
concerns itself with online groups. In contrast, many offline methods of creating
deindividuation suffer from being somewhat unreliable (Spears & Postmes, 2013),
dangerous (Drury & Reicher, 2000), or so salient (Reicher, 1982; Reicher, 1984), they
can have a confounding effect on the group’s identity and communication. In sum, it is
much more convenient to introduce deindividuation through CMC than any offline
method.
Early models. Early work on CMC emanated from ideas of media richness (Daft
& Lengel, 1986; Daft, Lengel & Trevino, 1987). Most researchers assumed that the
reduced social cues available in the online space would have significant consequences for
the resulting behaviors (Lea & Spears, 1991; Prentice-Dunn & Rogers, 1989). Two
exemplars of the different approaches taken by social psychology and communication are
the theory of electronic propinquity and the cuelessness model (Korzenny, 1978; Rutter,
1984).

38
The theory of electronic propinquity. Korzenny’s (1978) theory of electronic
propinquity explores how social proximity functions through mediated communication
channels. Much like other communication researchers, Korzenny (1978) focused
primarily on the act of communication itself, suggesting that users’ adaptation to a
channel would be the most powerful predictor of propinquity. While early testing of the
theory did not support it (Korzenny & Bauer, 1981), later evidence suggests that this
tenet, users’ familiarity and skill with the channel, holds true for CMC groups (Walther &
Bazarova, 2008).
The cuelessness model. Social psychologists also focused on media richness in
CMC, particularly in the context of a lack of social cues. According to the cuelessness
model, the availability and opportunities to express a social identity would decrease along
CMC networks because these networks stripped users of the ability to imbue messages
with as many social cues as face to face communication allowed (Rutter, 1984; Rutter
1987). Challenges to the cuelessness model (Lea & Spears, 1991) would eventually
cause it to fall out of favor along with the idea that CMC necessitated reduced social
proximity (Lea, O’Shea, Fung, & Spears, 1992; Sassenberg & Jones, 2012).
Deindividuation theory. One of the driving theoretical approaches to CMC was
deindividuation theory, which argues that CMC should create a loss of identity
(Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952). Early social identity work refuted
deindividuation in offline settings (Reicher, 1982; 1984) but CMC reinvigorated the
debate because it created outcomes extremely suggestive of deindividuation (Lea &
Spears, 1991). In particular, the anonymity in CMC networks created a problem because
the behavior of users often mirrored the expectations laid out by deindividuation theory
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(Festinger, Pepitone, & Newcomb, 1952) and the consequences of deindividuation in the
offline context (Zimbardo, 1971).
The problem of anonymity. The preceding sections all outline challenges that
CMC presents which researchers sought to address through use of theorizing and the
creation of models. The most important, and enduring, of these challenges comes in the
form of anonymity. Anonymity creates unique conditions that tie into each of the three
ideas presented above; it reduces social cues, constricts media propinquity, and creates
conditions that allow for deindividuation. Yet while research supports the finding that
anonymity can increase the incidence of ‘flaming’ (an early term for aggressive and
uninhibited behavior on CMC networks) (O’Sullivan, & Flanagin, 2003), it also supports
the idea that anonymity can increase social proximity (Lea, Spears, & De Groot, 2001),
cooperation (Lea, Spears, & Watt, 2007; Lea, Rogers, & Postmes, 2002), and prosocial
behavior (Le Hénaff, Michinov, Le Bohec, & Delaval, 2015).
Differences across disciplines. Part of the divide on anonymity comes from the
division between communication and social psychology research agendas. As mentioned
before, social psychologists tend to place far more emphasis on the psychological aspects
of behavior while communication researchers place more emphasis on understanding
communicative acts (Hornsey et al., 2008). In the case of anonymity, this leads to a
slight division. Communication researchers are much more interested in the effects of
anonymity on communication itself while social psychologists seek to understand
anonymity’s interaction with behavior and social cognition. Clearly, there is overlap in
terms of behavioral effects and communication acts. The difference in this area of study,
when and where those differences become salient, is typically located in the area of
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identity. Social psychology often pairs identity considerations with anonymity while
communication researchers take a deeper look at the consequences of anonymous
communication and preferences of individuals. Of course, these differences are in many
cases skin deep as researchers in both fields often grapple with the same issues.
Consequences of anonymity for social interaction. Generally, the study of social
interaction and anonymity begins with the study of how anonymity affects
communication patterns and norms. Communication researchers in this area are
interested in social desirability (DeAndrea, Tom Tong, Liang, Levine, Walther, 2012),
incivility (Santana, 2014; Rowe, 2015; Coe, Kenski, & Rains, 2014; Hmielowski,
Hutchens, Cicchirillo, 2014), users’ evaluation of one another’s comments (Anderson,
Brossard, Scheufele, Xenos, & Ladwig, 2013; Walther, DeAndrea, Kim, & Anthony
2010; Lee & Jang, 2010), disclosure (Snyder, 2004), and support systems (Campbell &
Wright, 2002; Kang, 2017; Leonard & Toller, 2012). Beyond interaction, organizational
communication researchers examine issues of identity (Rains & Scott, 2007), taxonomies
of organizations (Scott, 2013), and organization’s need for secrecy (Scott & Rains, 2005;
Scott, 2013; Cruz, 2017).
Interdisciplinary efforts often involve computer scientists and collaboration across
disciplinary lines looking at anonymous networks in terms of how desirable anonymity is
over time (Stutzman, Gross, & Acquisti, 2013), the effect it has on the social norms of the
network (Bernstein, Monroy-Hernández, Harry, André, Panovich, & Vargas, 2011), and
how users create anonymized communication (Leavitt, 2015). Other interests include
education in a variety of fields (Roselli & Brophy, 2006; Gallagher-Lepak, Reilly, &
Killion, 2009), support systems (Lim & Guo, 2008), and news frames (Borah, 2013).
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Social psychologists share many of the same research interests. For example,
notable points of intersection are incivility (Moore, Nakano, Enomoto, & Suda, 2012;
Rösner & Krämer, 2016), identity (Scott, Rains, & Haseki, 2011), and evaluation of
others’ messages (Christie & Dill, 2016). Interests relatively unique to social psychology
include minority influence (McLeod, Baron, Marti, & Yoon, 1997), collective action
(Postmes, 2007; Postmes & Brunsting, 2002), and power dynamics (Spears, Postmes,
Lea, & Wolbert, 2002; Spears & Lea, 1994), particularly those related to gender (Tang &
Fox, 2016; Alhabash, Hales, Baek, & Oh, 2014).
A great deal of the research within the social psychology field comes from the
social identity model of deindividuation effects (SIDE). Much of this research is
interdisciplinary, with a number of contributions from the communication field. These
studies refine (Lee, 2004; Lee 2008; van der Land, Schouten, Feldberg, Huysman, & van
der Hooff, 2015), empirically test (Kim, Kim, & Park, 2016; Chan, 2010), or broaden the
operational context (Carr, Vitak, & McLaughlin, 2013; Uhrich, S. & Tombs, A. 2014;
Yilmaz & Peña, 2014; Festl, Scharkow, & Quandt, 2015) of SIDE research.
Anonymity in this paper. Anonymity connects to SIDE intrinsically, if not
explicitly, because the most common manipulation to produce a deindividuation
manipulation is anonymity. Such is the use of anonymity in this paper. This paper
utilizes the social identity approach as a framework for investigating the dual nature of
groups. In order to determine the features of the group it is important to render the social
identity of the group salient to the participants. As described by SIDE a cognitive
deindividuation manipulation, operationalized as anonymity, will be sufficient to
accomplish this goal. The reasons for this are explored below.
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Overview of the Social Identity model of Deindividuation Effects

In a sense, SIDE is nothing more than a generalization of the social identity
approach to a CMC setting. This is because the fundamental goal of SIDE is to explain
the impact manipulations common to the CMC setting have on social identity. SIDE has
large implications for the study of groups in a CMC setting as it explains the impact that
manipulations sometimes inherent to CMC have on the way groups communicate by
shifting the salience of social identity and the consequences of identity expression for
members of the group (Postmes, Spears, Sakhel, & de Groot, 2001; Sassenburg &
Postmes, 2002).
The most important implication is that the groups in a CMC setting often gain an
increased salience of social identity without the presence of another group (Postmes,
Spears, & Lea, 2002). What this means is that research on CMC groups does not need to
invoke an out-group to demonstrate the importance of the group. Thus, studies involving
CMC do not require the presence of the out-group for the in-group to demonstrate
polarization and salient social identity tendencies.
Two routes to deindividuation. The social identity approach is a fundamental
rejection of Allport’s (1924) individually focused idea of group psychology. In other
words, SIDE posits that the individual in a group is a different creature to the individual
alone (Haslam et al., 2011). Deindividuation manipulations cause changes in identity
salience by this mechanism. They either accentuate or minimize the differences between
members of a category (Reicher et al., 1995). Minimization decreases distinctiveness
when applied to members of the same category. In contrast, maximization decreases
distinctiveness when applied to members of opposing categories. Deindividuation
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manipulations, in turn, are nothing more than actions that maximize or minimize
distinctions.
SIDE advances that deindividuation manipulations occur because of various
factors that accentuate the salience of social identity in a CMC context while the salient
social identity is the social identity of the crowd (Reicher et al., 1995; Postmes, Spears &
Lea, 1998; Spears, & Lea, 1992; 1994). From a theoretical standpoint, this means that
deindividuation is not a distinct concept. Instead, it is a specific kind of social identity
experience. This experience occurs in two ways, cognitive or strategic.
The cognitive route to deindividuation. The cognitive route to deindividuation
involves deindividuation manipulations that occur on the individual level. These
manipulations bear a great deal of similarity to the previous theoretical approach to
deindividuation, many of the manipulations that occur are the same from an operational
standpoint with critical differences from a theoretical standpoint.
Cognitive deindividuation concerns itself with the means of an individual’s
representation. Cognitive deindividuation occurs when an individual is anonymous in a
way that enhances the salience of social identity at the expense of personal identity
salience (Spears & Postmes, 2013). What this means is that the opportunity to express,
and availability of, personal identity decreases in favor of opportunities to express and
availability of social identity.
Anonymity itself is unnecessary for this to occur (Spears & Postmes, 2013),
however anonymity and reduced visual representation are the most common means of
achieving cognitive deindividuation manipulations (Postmes & Spears, 1998).
Depersonalization, while not identical to deindividuation, shares a great deal of similarity
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with cognitive deindividuation specifically because cognitive deindividuation
manipulations often go hand in hand with depersonalizing mechanisms (Spears &
Postmes, 2013).
The strategic route to deindividuation. Strategic deindividuation, in contrast to
cognitive, is not concerned with the expression and availability of identity to the
individual themselves but rather the expression and availability of that identity to
everyone else. This kind of deindividuation occurs when an individual has the
opportunity to express social identity that they otherwise would not be able to (Spears &
Postmes, 2013).
Sometimes this occurs through solidarity, when deindividuation manipulations
bring disparate or powerless groups together by means of giving them social support
(Spears, Lea, Conelliussen, Postmes, & Ter Haar, 2002). Other times this occurs when
anonymity to a more powerful group renders the individual capable of expressing aspects
of a social identity without fear of reprisal (Postmes et al., 2001). Of course, both of
these also can occur in reverse, as members shed aspects of identity to fit in with a group
(Spears, Lea, Postmes, & Wolbert, 2011).
The current research, however, is less concerned with the strategic route to
deindividuation. While the distinction between the two routes is important to draw for
context and a clear understanding of the phenomena involved, strategic deindividuation is
less common than cognitive in the context of social identity formation (Postmes, Spears
et al., 2005). Cognitive deindividuation, in contrast, is often a feature of many CMC
identity formation contexts because website designers can create sites with cognitive
deindividuation in mind (although that decision is usually not so explicitly theoretical)
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(Ren, Kraut, & Kiesler, 2007; Ren, Harper, Drenner, Terveen, Kiesler, Riedl, & Kraut,
2012).
SIDE and social identity formation. SIDE itself has no implications for social
identity formation. Without a social identity, no deindividuation manipulations are
possible because deindividuation consists of a manipulation of the salience of social
identity. If identity is in the process of formation, then obviously no social identity
exists.
Once formed, however, the mechanism by which the group created the social
identity does interact with SIDE. Deindividuation accentuates the features of the group.
In other words, the prototypical behavior of the group becomes more pronounced.
Members of a group, especially outside of a laboratory, may disagree on selfcategorization, what constitutes prototypical, and the categorization of others (Spears &
Postmes, 2013; Drury & Reicher, 2000; 2005).
The manner of that disagreement, however, depends in part on the character of the
group. Some groups tolerate a great deal of dissent, while others prioritize unity. Of
course, this often changes as circumstances change for the group. For a large and diverse
group consensus may not emerge and active negotiation as well as disagreement can
continue for an extended period. Existing work demonstrates this effect in crowds.
Reicher’s work on social identity and crowd psychology. Deindividuation has
the effect of accentuating the norms and bringing them to the forefront of behavior. With
use, norms change. Further, these changes to the group have consequences on the
context. Reicher’s (1984) work on the St. Pauls race riot underscores exactly how
drastically context shifts change norms. The St. Pauls riot occurred in 1980 as police
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raided a café in St. Pauls, Bristol, England. The district was struggling under racial and
economic tension at the time, and investigators generally attribute the cause of the riot to
these factors.
Reicher points out that protestors only became rioters after police removed the
prototypicality of the moderates. Once police uniformly regarded all protestors as
dangerous and violent, the prototype shifted because the police’s influence allowed them
to achieve a strategic deindividuation manipulation (1984; 2001). The prototype shifted
along with the social identity and the protestors became rioters. Notably, the identity did
not disappear, the rioters created clear limits, with lines drawn on the edges of the riot
through placement of physical objects and signs. Even when police came directly to
these barriers, rioters did not engage until they passed through (Reicher, 1984; Reicher,
2001).
The above example along with Drury and Reicher’s (2000; 2005) further work
with crowds delineates a strategic route through the group’s reactions to the actions of the
out-group. This is often the case. However, cognitive deindividuation can have similar
effects as groups lose the ability to express identity in contrast to the position of the group
(Hancock & Merola, 2005; Ivory, Fox, Waddell, & Ivory, 2014).
Routes to Social Identity Formation and Deindividuation

Groups can reach the same social identity through different channels. Those
different channels have a long-term effect on group psychology that becomes salient
under conditions of deindividuation. As a result, deindividuation creates a means of
determining how a group formed without observing formation.
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Interactive model of social identity formation. The question of categorization
is central to the creation of identity. For the formation of a social identity, it is critical
that members agree on categorization of themselves and others within the social group.
Turner (1982) proposed a deductive route to categorization where members engage in a
deliberative process and examine the superordinate category characteristics to determine
fit (Reicher, 2001).
For the unstructured crowd in a situation demanding a novel social identity, a
deductive route can still occur. In this case, because of the unstructured nature of the
group and the lack of established methods of deliberating on various aspects of identity,
individuals infer a social identity from observation of prototypical group members
(Reicher, 1982; Reicher, 2001). Notably, the concept of what is prototypical at that stage
is largely unformed so this observation rests on the perceptions of crowd members.
Still, just because the social identity (and the accompanying set of social norms) is
yet unformed does not mean it holds no influence, as Reicher (2001) notes “crowd
members do not simply ask 'what is appropriate for us in this context?' but 'what is
appropriate for us as members of this category in this context?'” (p. 15). At no point does
the influence of the categorization, and by extension the social group, disappear.
But some crowds form around highly individual social identities. Strong leaders
create social identities that can mirror of their own. Even Le Bon (1885) acknowledges
this when he writes about the conductor, a singular member with almost total power over
the mindless drone-like members of the crowd. Inductive formation is a distributed and
grounded form of this idea. Instead of a singular conductor, every member of a group
can exert influence on the overall social identity. In inductive cases, the social identity is
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the sum of these individual efforts. In most group, the process of social identity
formation is both at once, a mixture of individual efforts and questions of categorical fit.
The question then, is to what extent inductive and deductive influences represent
a better picture of the social group. This is, of course, nothing more than the
disagreement over the proper approach to group behavior outlined previously on an
applied level. On one side are those who come from the work of Allport (1924), placing
the individual at the focus of the inquiry. On the other side are those who descended
from the ideas of Le Bon (1885) and Festinger (1954), arguing that individual in the
crowd creates a fundamentally different psychological state than the individual alone.
The interactive model of social identity formation is an attempt to reconcile these
perspectives through the lens of the social identity approach (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab,
2005). The basic introduction to this model is above, but to recap it extends the same
arguments advanced by Turner (1982) and Reicher (2001). It points out that the
inductive and deductive routes to categorization also create inductive and deductive
routes to social identity formation (Turner, 1982; Reicher, 1982; Reicher, 2001; Postmes,
Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). Postmes, Haslam, and Swaab (2005) argue that both routes
exist in parallel. In short, groups can form around individual contributions and
superordinate associations, both are valid routes to creation of a group. These two routes
have important consequences for the group in the context of a deindividuation paradigm.
Consequences of inductive and deductive social identity formation.

Deindividuation studies repeatedly demonstrate that manipulations done after individuals

enter into a group accentuate category salience while those self-same manipulations done
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before have the opposite effect (Reicher et al., 1995; Wang, 2007; Lee, 2004; Lee, &

Jang, 2010; Tanis & Postmes, 2007; Villanova, Beria, Costa, & Koller, 2017). Notably,

inductive and deductive groups are both groups, so while deindividuation increases some

variables in the same fashion, it also accentuates the different compositions of these

groups. Below, this paper explores why that occurs.

In a follow up to the social identity formation study, Postmes, Spears, Lee and
Novak (2005) found that for inductively created social identities, depersonalization is not
a source of social influence. The opposite is true for deductively created social identities,
in these groups depersonalization is a source of social influence. Further work
demonstrates the mechanism underlying this difference stems from the decision-making
patterns of the groups involved. Deductively created identities tend to value the group
while inductively created identities value the individuality of the members of the group.
This occurs because inductive social identities encourage a degree of individuality within
group members or salience of heterogeneity while deductive social identities encourage a
degree of social agreement and unanimity amongst members or homogeneity (Postmes,
Spears et al., 2005; Jans et al., 2012).
Deindividuation increases social identity salience. So post deindividuation,
groups try to find a consensual interpretation of a social identity, one upon which all
members agree. The heterogeneous group achieves this in ways that reflect the
individuality of members while the homogenous group achieves this in ways that reflect
the group’s communal identity. Thus, post deindividuation manipulations, inductively
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created identities produce a greater degree of heterogeneous social identity salience
within a group. Deductively created identities produce a higher degree of homogenous
social identity salience within a group (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).
Actual change in the social identity can occur because of deindividuation. While
a group, especially a crowd, does not always have the chance to redo social identity
formation in response to every new stimuli, aspects of a social identity do change
depending on context (Postmes et al., 2000; Sassenberg & Postmes, 2002; Drury &
Reicher, 2000). Further, social identity formation is ongoing and never ending.
Reicher (2001) points out in his critique of emergent norm theory exactly this,
understanding identity depends on understanding context. As a result, individual
members are always evaluating potential shifts or realignments to the identity in the
context of the social group. As deindividuation accentuates the social identity, the result
therefore is not merely accentuation of the social identity but accentuation of the
homogeneity of the group itself as members converge on an identity (Jans, Leach, Garcia,
& Postmes, 2015). For inductive groups, deindividuation then accentuates the
heterogeneity of the group’s identity as members still converge, but through a greater
measure of disagreement and personal contributions (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).
The result, when examining the features of the social identity, is generally almost
indistinguishable. Indeed, social identity salience in both cases can be identical as well.
The critical difference rests in how each group reaches those positions. In other words,
deindividuation increases what is already present. It brings to the forefront the primary
nature of the group, deductive or inductive.
Self-Referential Discussion
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But the inquiry is still too broad. Even the two routes, deductive and inductive,
still encompass broad areas of social identity formation. Further, as Postmes, Haslam,
and Swaab (2005) point out, groups usually use both routes simultaneously to determine
identity. This inquiry is less concerned with establishing a deeper understanding of the
theoretical social identity formation routes and more concerned with expanding an
understanding of the processes groups use in live settings.
One such process is self-referential discussion. Sometimes referred to as “metadiscussion” this is any kind of discussion where the topic is the group itself. In the
context of the social identity approach, self-referential discussion is simply a winnowed
down version of social identity formation.
Lack of clarity for self-referential discussion as a route to social identity

formation. But the first problem is not what occurs during self-referential discussion but

rather how to classify self-referential discussion. It is unclear if self-referential

discussion is deductive or inductive because the fit between self-referential discussion

and either route depends on context.

As neither a deductive nor an inductive route to social identity formation. In
many contexts, self-referential discussion is inductive, because the social identity does
not come from an outside source or from association with a superordinate group. The
group conducting self-referential discussion engages in a self-contained process of
identity formation (Jans et al., 2012). In textbook fashion, this inductive route to social
identity formation rests on the contributions of individual members (Postmes, Spears et
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al., 2005) who explicitly demarcate personal opinions and positions that filter to the
larger group. Further, members can outline positions that inherently support the
heterogeneity of the group and drive the entire process further towards an inductive,
individually based process (Haslam et al., 2011).
But during self-referential discussion members do not ignore the influence of the
group nor do they escape it. They do not engage in the process without a consideration of
the group. Members actively engage with the group and contributions become the
property of the group and not the individual. To restate Reicher’s (2001) point, the
process becomes deductive when members ask, “'what is appropriate for us as members
of this category in this context?'” (p. 15).
Further, the structure of the self-referential process directly matches with Turner’s
(1982) deductive route to categorization because it carries order, shape, and depends on
deliberation concerned primarily with the general category identity. While categorization
is not analogous to social identity creation, the two processes carry a great deal of overlap
because arbitration of membership can constitute social identity creation or change
(Reicher, 2001). Simply deciding who is or is not a member is often a deductive social
identity creation process (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005).
Self-referential discussion does not cleanly fall into either category. Depending
on context, either assessment becomes appropriate. But in live contexts, members do not
conduct the discussion entirely in reference to the group, nor do they conduct the
discussion as a function of their individuality.
The problem of context. The previous section illustrates the difficulty of
classifying self-referential discussion. Various studies classify self-referential discussion
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into either route using some of the justifications listed above. Some adopt the inductive
argument (Smith et al., 2015; Moscovici, 1980; Smith & Postmes, 2011; van Zomeren,
Spears, Fischer & Leach, 2004) and others argue the opposite (Reicher & Hopkins, 2001;
Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005; Swaab, Postmes, van Beest, & Spears, 2007).
This divide occurs primarily due to disagreements about relevant context.
Researchers often consider the presence of the out-group and the salient social identity an
indicator of a deductive discussion. Many argue the process is deductive when it begins
at the intergroup level, as the presence of another group prompts the discussion (Drury &
Reicher, 2000, 2005; Reicher, 2001). Therefore, category salience is high and members
must actively confront the out-group’s interpretation of the in-group’s social identity
(Swaab et al., 2007; Reicher, 1982).
In contrast, some adopt the inductive argument because when no salient out-group
appears the participants drive the process (Smith et al., 2015; Smith & Postmes, 2011).
Focusing on the intragroup communication and context often indicates that no salient
social identity drives the process, and as a result, the discussion is inductive. But this
divide is rather unsatisfactory because research repeatedly demonstrates through the
cognitive route to deindividuation that no intergroup impetus is required for discussion to
prompt a shift in social identity (Postmes et al., 2000; Postmes et al., 2001; Sassenberg &
Postmes, 2002), or to promote category salience (Reicher et al., 1995; Tanis & Postmes,
2007; Lea, Spears, & Watt, 2007).
This explanation essentially prioritizes the deductive context over the inductive
when both are present, as a result minimizing the influence of the individual in favor of
the group. The problem with this approach is that it does not cleanly follow other
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findings. Research demonstrates that inductive group formation can occur through nonverbal means with limited interaction (Broekman, Gordjin, Koudenburg, & Postmes,
2018), or between clearly deductively associated individuals (Khan, Hopkins, Reicher,
Tewari, Srinivasan, & Stevenson, 2016), suggesting even contexts where the formation of
the group is completely deductive the resulting group can still be inductive. Ignoring the
context that individuals bring into a group means a return to the idea that crowds dictate
behavior unilaterally and that members cannot resist the overwhelming influence of the
group (Reicher, 2001). As a result, for CMC groups where deindividuation is extremely
common, it is critical to broaden the understanding of what contexts indicate inductive or
deductive social identity formation.
But it is unclear that either of these answers is better than the other, or better than
another answer altogether. Yet it is clear that self-referential discussion does not always
cleanly fall into one category or another, always due to context. The issue, then, is how
to distinguish between deductive or inductive contexts in situ. The resolution to this
particular distinction, however, involves the use of CMC and SIDE. Breaking down the
pieces that create self-referential discussion provides a means of addressing the lack of
clarity regarding the relevant context.
Proposed resolution to the problem of context. Reviewing the divide outlined
above, both inductive and deductive contexts stem from different viewpoints of the
relevant context. As pointed out before, self-referential discussion could simultaneously
consist of two parts, an inductive and a deductive. As a result, it is possible to assume the
potential for inductive and deductive identity formation coexists in conversation. Broken
down, one of these contexts is form, the other, content. Much as other scholars
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previously explored the form and the content of norms (Hogg & Reid, 2006; Cialdini et
al., 1990), self-referential discussion also contains form and content. Form being the
terms, limits, and means of the discussion while content is the discussion itself.
The form of self-referential discussion exhibits deductive features. Members
make judgments from the category and the superordinate association they share. The
process begins (in the laboratory setting) through the impetus of the out-group, at the
urging of the researchers. Participants then conduct a deductive process of discussion
regarding their social identity. The content of the self-referential discussion exhibits
inductive features. Members contribute individual positions and opinions in an attempt
to resolve disputes and settle on a consensual social identity.
What this means is that the initial phase and form of self-referential discussion
will be deductive while the content and process itself will be inductive. In sum, selfreferential discussion is a deductively induced and guided process of inductive identity
formation. In other words, members deduce, from information given by researchers and
context, the way they will go about inductively creating the social identity for their social
group. This paper is not the first to argue the same conclusion regarding the division of
form and content. Koudenburg, Postmes, and Gordijn, (2017) make a similar argument
prioritizing a slightly different use of form, that of conversational features such as nonverbal cues.
The use of CMC does automatically standardize the form of the discussion to an
extent, nominally creating deductive conditions. Yet as Koudenburg, Postmes, and
Gordijn (2017) point out individuals generally only notice violations on the implicit level.
As a result, CMC alone does not provide a deductive pathway. In other words,
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standardizing the means of interaction does not prevent the formation of inductive groups
(Koudenburg, Postmes, Gordijn, & Van Mourik Brokeman, 2015). Thus, providing both
a deductive and inductive context on the explicit level provides an even playing field.
Context in live groups. As Postmes, Spears, Lee, and Novak (2005) point out, “it
is unlikely that in any group encountered in real life will social identity be entirely
induced or deduced,” (p. 761). As a result, it is inherently a difficult proposition to try to
generalize the results of studies invoking only one kind of identity formation process to
real world groups. This means that the casual observer cannot make easy use of
theoretical models of group behavior as a means of understanding live groups without
accounting for this limitation. Or, to return to the baseball example, it is impossible to
clearly demarcate the nature of the team without prioritizing the analysis of either
inductive or deductive levels, e.g. looking at the players or the club’s culture.
The goal of this research is to help resolve this issue, guiding the observer on
which context to prioritize, by providing insight into the nature of groups in a limited
context when both deductive and inductive influences are even and when social identity
salience is high. In other words, if the group has the opportunity to form in both
directions and equal impetus to do so, which influence wins out? In situ, a group of
friends gathers at a local park for a pick-up game of baseball and appoints co-captains.
One co-captain supports naming his side the Yankees and emulating their style while
another co-captain tries to build the team around the players’ traits, assuming neither
captain exhibits significantly greater social influence, in which direction does the team
develop?
The State of the Problem
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The underlying causes of group interaction effects generally are understood
poorly compared to the understanding of outcomes associated with group interactions
(Meleady, Hopthrow, & Crisp, 2013). In particular, group discussion as a component of
the social identity formation process remains an understudied aspect of group psychology
(Wittenbaum & Moreland, 2008; Hogg & Reid, 2006). As well, the ever-increasing
importance and abundance of groups in the online sphere only highlights questions about
the mechanisms underlying group communication. In this dichotomy, discussion is
among the more prevalent forms of interaction and perhaps the most apt when looking to
develop direct comparisons to groups outside the laboratory.
This paper attempts to resolve one such question. Self-referential discussion is a
critical piece of social identity formation not just as a group forms but as a group
continues to negotiate and redefine itself. It appears in crowds (Drury & Reicher, 2000;
2005), in questions of leadership (Haslam et al., 2011), in disagreements over category fit
(Reicher, 2001), in both inductive and deductive social identity formation efforts
(Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005; Hogg & Reid, 2006), and throughout the group’s
lifecycle (Meleady et al., 2013). In sum, discussion plays an important role in many
group processes.
But precisely because self-referential discussion is so broad, it is so difficult to
define. When attempting to do so, context plays a crucial and determinant role, after all
“there is no generic group effect” (Reicher et al., 1995, p. 173). As discussed above,
relevant context stems from two primary sources: form and content.
The question, then, is which portion exerts greater influence, content or form.
SIDE offers a means of making this determination because it accentuates the

58
consequences of the route. For inductive groups it accentuates heterogeneity. For
deductive groups it accentuates homogeneity salience (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005;
Postmes, Spears et al., 2005; Jans et al., 2012; Swaab et al., 2007). Therefore,
deindividuation presents a viable means of sifting for dominant contextual influences in
live discussion.
This leads to the question: To what extent does social identity formation through
self-referential discussion lead to an increase in the salience of a heterogeneous or
homogeneous social identity for CMC groups that experience deindividuation compared
to those that do not?
Research Questions

The purpose of this experiment is to determine relevant contexts for IMSIF based
groups in situ. The means of accomplishing that is to utilize a method that allows for the
combination of two different contexts, form and content, in the same group, then to
utilize a deindividuation manipulation to examine the differences in the salient social
identity as a marker of the dominant, or more influential, context.
Guiding Question: To what extent does social identity formation through selfreferential discussion lead to an increase in the salience of a heterogeneous or
homogeneous social identity for CMC groups that experience deindividuation
compared to those that do not?
RQ1: Does social identity formation occur through self-referential discussion?
RQ2: Does social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to a
salient heterogeneous social identity?
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RQ3: Does social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to a
salient homogeneous social identity?
RQ4: Does deindividuation change the salience of social identity for CMC groups
formed using self-referential discussion?
Method

Participants

Participants were recruited through a convenience and snowball sample of
students at a mid-sized private university located in the Midwest. Sampling involved
sixty participants (n = 60) divided evenly between deindividuation (n = 30) and control (n
= 30) conditions. Each condition included an equal number of groups (n = 10). Groups
consisted of three randomly assigned participants each (n = 3). Members did not have
prior history with the group or with other members. As a result of the snowball sample
and random assignment it was possible for members with prior history of one another to
participate in the same group, however this did not occur. No group exceeded an hour
from the start of the experiment to the conclusion. No group completed the experiment in
under 15 minutes. Groups in both conditions took an average of 28 minutes to complete
the experiment including the closing survey. Participants ranged in age from 18 to 23.
Procedures

Through a Facebook post (Appendix A), participants were invited to participate in
the study. Participants were free to invite others to complete the intake survey and
participate in the study as well so long as they fit the study criteria.
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Participants completed a short quiz on color preferences (Appendix B). This is a
sorting mechanism similar to those used in previous group research (Haslam et al., 2011).
Ostensibly, these preferences form the basis for subsequent sorting into groups. In
reality, group assignment was random. Groups consisted of three members each.
Control. Participants in the control group then received a short informational
sheet informing them of the purpose of the study (Appendix C). Beyond introducing the
participants to the experiment, the content of this message accomplished two things.
First, it primed the form of the discussion as deductive. Second, it primed the content of
the discussion as inductive.
Then participants conducted a self-referential discussion using IRC (Internet
Relay Chat). Finally, members participated in a stag hunt game (Appendix D). The
game provided a continued method of interaction after group formation, so it was
unimportant who won and as a result winners were not recorded.
After completion of the game, members took a survey (Appendix G). The survey
consisted of fifteen questions, although only Questions 1, 6, 8, and 11 were scored.
These questions came from Leach van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje,
Ouwerkerk, and Spears’ (2008) Hierarchical Model of In-Group Identification. Other
questions (unscored) were adapted from the Revised Group Cohesiveness Scale and
Group Attitude Scale (Treadwell, Lavertue, Kumar, & Veeraraghavan, 2001; Evans &
Jarvis, 1986) to increase the realism of the survey and obfuscate the relevant questions
from participants.
Question 14 served as a manipulation check. It came from the single item
measure of Social Identification (SISI) utilized in SIDE and social identity research
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(Postmes, Haslam, & Jens, 2013). The check served to ensure that all groups developed a
salient social identity during the experiment and was used for both control and
deindividuation conditions.
Deindividuation Condition. The second condition introduced a deindividuation
manipulation. This manipulation caused a slight variation in procedures. Groups took
the same color survey (Appendix A) and were still assigned randomly. However, they
did receive a slightly different information sheet (Appendix E). This adjustment reflected
the different method of playing the game that participants in the deindividuation
condition experienced.
Unlike the control group, the deindividuation condition used an anonymous
computer network with fake names (e.g. Player A) instead of real names. They received
a different instruction sheet to reflect this change (Appendix F). As with the control
group, the purpose of the game was to sustain interaction, this time through a medium
that causes cognitive deindividuation, so winners were not recorded.
At the conclusion of the game, members completed the same survey as control
(Appendix G). This survey was identically assessed; only four of the questions (1, 6, 8,
and 11), were scored and question 14 was a manipulation check.
Measures

This section covers several key definitions used in this paper as well as features of
the main variables and conditions of the data itself. It defines these constructs and then
provides statistical information about measures used in the experiment.
Defining Key Constructs. For a minimal group paradigm, norm creation and
social identity creation functionally constitute the same process because no previous
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incarnations of either exist. As the group creates norms for itself, they define the
meaning of the social identity.
Social identification, as per the social identity theory definition, referred to the
extent that a person adopts and identifies with a particular social identity in the form of a
group membership (Turner et al., 1987).
Self-definition referred to the classic social identity understanding advanced by
Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, and Spears (2008)
as a measure of both individual self-stereotyping and in-group homogeneity. Selfdefinition is a reliable measure of the salience of homogeneity at both the individual and
group level due to this multicomponent assessment. That allowed it to serve as an
effective means of measurement in this experiment.
Independent and Dependent Variables. The independent variable was a
cognitive deindividuation manipulation. The dependent variable was participants’ scores
on the Likert scale assessment of self-definition taken from Leach van Zomeren, Zebel,
Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, and Spears’ (2008) Hierarchical Model of InGroup Identification. The dependent variable in this experiment was mixed. In other
words, it varied at both the individual and between groups level. The different groups
were not expected to demonstrate the same average nor were individuals within groups
expected to demonstrate the same scores for measures of homogeneity salience.
Additionally, group members were indistinguishable and sampled from the same
population. As a result, group members were treated as replications of one another
between and within the groups (Kashy & Hagiwara, 2012).
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Non-independence. Finally, as with a great deal of small group research, it was
possible that the scores would exhibit non-independence because one individual’s
assessment of a perceptual category is potentially a predictor of other group member’s
assessment of a perceptual category (Kashy & Hagiwara, 2012; Kashy & Donnellan,
2012). As members of these groups were indistinguishable, a modified actor-partner
interaction model (APIM) calculation adapted for groups was appropriate to remove any
non-independence from the data.
As a result, the first step upon obtaining data was to run the modified interclass
correlation (ICC) assessment used with an APIM. While this assumption of nonindependence for a data set developed around a perceptual category did carry some risk
of a type II error when running the ICC, the consequences of a type I error are a
decreased validity in results (Grawitch & Munz, 2004) and were severe enough to justify
the possibility of a type II error.
The ICC was run for each group in the experiment. The significance level for this
test was relatively liberal, as suggested in Grawitch and Munz (2004), at 0.1 (in this
specific test, higher values indicated greater significance, had the ICC exceeded 0.1 it
would have been significant). However, the ICC did not return a significant mark for the
majority of the groups. In other words, variance within groups and variance between
groups did not differ by a significant amount for most groups in the dataset and as such,
no correction was performed on the data set. Comparison between control and
deindividuation groups was then accomplished by way of a between samples t-test.
Survey Questions. The main set of questions tested participant’s perception of
in-group homogeneity salience and individual self-stereotyping. The primary difference
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between these two pairs of questions was the phrasing, the first asked about the
participant while the second asked about the group as a whole (e.g. I am similar to the
average person in my group vs. people in my group are very similar to each other). As no
outgroup existed for the experiment, the survey questions did not distinguish between in
and out groups. Instead, they reference the group participants joined for the duration of
the experiment as suggested in Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje,
Ouwerkerk, and Spears (2008).
Although two pairs of questions were used in the survey, both pairs come from
the same scale and so are often used in tandem. These two pairs of questions utilized
together served as a means of measuring self-definition, as defined above. Notably, their
coefficient as a set exceeded the 0.7 level suggested in Leach, van Zomeren, Zebel,
Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, and Spears (2008) for the entire data set (α =
.815), the control group (α = .833) and the deindividuation condition (α = .714).
Individual Self-Stereotyping. These two questions measured the extent of
participants self-stereotyping. They measured how similar participants felt themselves to
be with the rest of the group. Questions were rated on a 1-7 point Likert scale.
Descriptive statistics for the individual self-stereotyping questions are on Tables 1
(control) and 2 (deindividuation condition). Prior studies indicate 0.7 as an acceptable
minimum alpha coefficient for these two questions (Leach van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek,
Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, & Spears, 2008). In this study, the alpha was much
higher for the whole data set (α = .843) and for the control group (α = .879) but was not
as high for the deindividuation condition (α = .737) although it did still succeed the
check.
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Table 1
Individual Self-Stereotyping Control Group Descriptive Statistics

Questions
I have a lot in common

N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

30

2

7

5.30

1.236

30

2

7

5.47

1.167

with the average person in
my group.
I am similar to the average
person in my group.

Table 2
Individual Self-Stereotyping Deindividuation Condition Descriptive Statistics

Questions
I have a lot in common

N

Minimum Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

30

3

7

6.33

.994

30

4

7

6.07

.907

with the average person in
my group.
I am similar to the average
person in my group.

In-Group Homogeneity. These two questions measured the extent of
participant’s perceived level of similarity between all group members. They measured
how similar participants felt the group members a whole were to one another. Questions
were rated on a 1 to 7 point Likert scale. Descriptive statistics for the individual selfstereotyping questions are on Tables 3 (control) and 4 (deindividuation condition). Prior
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studies indicate 0.7 as an acceptable alpha coefficient for these two questions (Leach van
Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, & Spears, 2008), in this study
the coefficient exceeded that amount across the entire data set (α = .878) the
deindividuation condition (α = .835) and the control group (α = .895).

Table 3
In-Group Homogeneity Control Group Descriptive Statistics
Questions

N

Minimum Maximum

In my group people have a
lot in common with each
other.

30

1

People in my group are
very similar to each other.

30

1

Mean

Std. Deviation

7

5.23

1.501

7

5.00

1.414

Table 4
In-Group Homogeneity Deindividuation Condition Descriptive Statistics

Questions

N

Minimum Maximum

In my group people have a
lot in common with each
other.

30

1

People in my group are
very similar to each other.

30

1

Mean

Std. Deviation

7

5.97

1.497

7

5.80

1.297
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Manipulation Check. The question for the manipulation check came from a
different scale than the other questions, however as the Hierarchical Model of In-Group
Identification demonstrates inter-scale reliability with a number of other scales (Leach
van Zomeren, Zebel, Vliek, Pennekamp, Doosje, Ouwerkerk, & Spears, 2008), this study
also tested for similar reliability between the first four questions and the manipulation
check. The test demonstrated strong reliability between the manipulation check and the
rest of the questions for the entire dataset (α = .869) the control group (α = .871) and the
deindividuation condition (α = .825).
The manipulation check was successful. As the Single Item measure of Social
Identification (SISI) has a high degree of reliability (Postmes, Haslam, & Jens, 2013), the
bar for passing the manipulation check was 5. All conditions were expected to pass the
manipulation check, and all conditions exceeded 5 (see Table 5), although none exceeded
6. The difference between the control and the deindividuation condition was not
significant at the p < .05 level (p < .066).

Table 5
Single Item Social Identity Measure Descriptive Statistics

Questions

N

Minimum

Maximum

Mean

Std. Deviation

I identify with my group
(Control).

30

1

7

5.23

1.478

I identify with my group
(Deindividuation
condition).
I identify with my group
(Both).

30

1

7

5.93

1.413

60

1

7

5.58

1.476
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Results
Salience of Heterogeneous and Homogenous Identity
The primary test of the experiment related to the salience of identity, specifically
the kind of salient identity. These two types of identity were heterogeneous and
homogenous. As the names suggest, heterogeneous identity depended on awareness of
differences while homogenous identity depended on awareness of similarities. This
measure applied both to participant’s perceptions of self and to perceptions of others.
Descriptive Statistics. Scores on the identity questions were on a 1 to 7 point
Likert scale with values ranging from 1-7 observed on all questions. To test the saliency
of each kind of identity, the survey questions were averaged to create a new numeric
scale variable. The averaged scores ranged from 2-7 for the entire dataset. Lower scores
indicated a salient heterogeneous identity while higher scores indicated a salient
homogenous identity. Table 6 contains a breakdown of descriptive statistics for the
control and deindividuation groups.

Table 6
Averaged Scores Descriptive Statistics

Averages

N

Minimum Maximum

Averaged Scores

30

3.75

30

2.00

Mean

Std. Deviation

7.00

6.041

0.879

7.00

5.25

1.091

(Deindividuation)
Averaged Scores
(Control)
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Averaged Scores

60

2.00

7.00

5.646

1.060

(Both)

Does social identity formation occur through self-referential discussion?
Research question 1 asked if social identity formation could occur through self-referential
discussion. In other words, would the manipulation check demonstrate a salient social
identity for each group? Per Table 5’s measure of both conditions, a salient identity
formed in both conditions (control M. = 5.23, SD = 1.478; deindividuation M. = 5.93, SD
= 1.413). Social identity formation did occur through self-referential discussion.
Does social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to a
salient heterogeneous social identity? Research question 2 asked if self-referential
discussion would lead to a salient heterogeneous social identity. Heterogeneous social
identity is characterized by the salience of differences, group members are keenly aware
of what different attributes each member brings to the group. All four assessed questions
tested members’ perception of heterogeneity and the average of those questions assessed
overall perception of heterogeneity. A low average score indicated a salient
heterogeneous social identity. Group members averaged 5.646 (SD = 1.060) across all
questions per Table 6. Therefore, social identity formation through self-referential
discussion did not lead to a salient heterogeneous social identity.
Does social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to a
salient homogeneous social identity? Research question 3 asked if self-referential
discussion would lead to a salient homogeneous social identity. Awareness of

70
similarities characterizes homogeneous social identity. All four assessed questions tested
member’s perception of homogeneity and the average of those questions assessed overall
perception of homogeneity. A high average score indicated a salient homogeneous social
identity. Group members averaged 6.041 (SD = 0.879) across all questions per Table 6.
As a result, social identity formation through self-referential discussion did lead to a
salient homogeneous social identity.
Does deindividuation change the salience of social identity for CMC groups
formed using self-referential discussion? The results of a between samples t-test
demonstrated that there was a significant difference (p < .003) between the control and
deindividuation condition. Deindividuation averaged 6.041 with a standard deviation of
0.879. Because the questions all measure the same variable, breaking down averages per
each question was not done. Control averaged 5.25 with a standard deviation of 1.091.
Deindividuation, per these results, led to an increase of 0.791. The increase is not large,
but clearly present. This indicates that social identity formation through self-referential
discussion led to an increase in the salience of a homogeneous social identity for CMC
groups that experienced deindividuation compared to those that did not.
Discussion

This section will cover the implications of the experiment in the context of the
two theoretical approaches used throughout the literature review. It begins with a
discussion of the results, placing them in the context of the two approaches discussed in
the literature review. Then it discusses specific implications regarding the social identity
approach and the models utilized in structuring the paper before highlighting some
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general considerations of the results as a whole. The discussion section concludes with
an overview of the limitations of the study.
Does social identity formation occur through self-referential discussion?

Results indicated that social identity did form through self-referential discussion.
Group formation after a clear categorization occurred per social identity theory (Tajfel &
Turner, 1979). This was consistent with the overwhelming majority of social identity
research (see Hogg & Tindale, 2008; Haslam et al., 2011) as well as group research in
general (see Frey et al., 1999). However, the finding of note was the fact that unclear
categorization could prompt social identity formation as well. Most of the research
reviewed in the examples mentioned relies on clearly defined social identities for
experimentation purposes. When participants have the opportunity to define their own
social identity and the features of that social identity, the reliability of social identity
theory becomes much less clear.
A growing body of literature stemming from the Interactive Model of Social
Identity Formation (IMSIF) explores this subject (Koudenburg, Postmes, Gordjin, & Van
Mourik Brokeman, 2015; Koudenburg, Postmes, & Gordjin, 2017; Broekman, Gordjin,
Koudenburg, & Postmes, 2018) with the understanding that the social identity approach
alone is not the ultimate predictor of group behavior. Generally these studies find that
identity formation is not only possible but quite common even in situations where
identity is not explicitly communicated, and in the case of one study involving no verbal
communication between participants (Koudenburg, Postmes, & Gordjin, 2017) possible
with only tenuous affiliations like location and actions. The present study examined
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CMC groups exclusively, demonstrating that the findings of these studies extend into the
computer-mediated space as well as the offline space.
Implications for Groups as a Collection of Interpersonal Relationships. The
process of group formation that occurred also invoked the other group theories discussed
in the literature review. This paper draws a clear parallel between the processes
described in symbolic convergence theory (Bormann, 1972) and the processes of identity
consolidation and formation that developed in the small groups studied. Members
entered into the groups with different ideas of what the social identity should entail and
then engaged in the process of developing a mutual interpretation. Upon the completion
of that process, a gestalt social identity emerged that did not exist prior to social
engagement.
In general, the high awareness members exhibited of one another’s opinions and
attitudes indicated the influence of theories of social learning. Alongside symbolic
convergence theory, social comparison theory (Festinger, 1954) discusses how this
process can result in the creation of a group (Barsade, 2002). Group members commonly
engaged in a process of not only negotiation of the shared fantasy, but also consideration
of how other members acted and interpreted the potential rules to create a collective
social identity, adding additional weight to the utility of social comparison theory as a
method of examining group formation. While members did not have the opportunity to
seek out others with similar views, they modeled the group on shared traits through
observation, a process described in social comparison theory.
Implications for Gestalt Groups. From a gestalt group perspective, the research
design mirrored the norming-forming-storming-performing model of group development
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(Tuckman, 1965). While no formal interaction analysis occurred, it was telling that most
group members engaged in the process of creating norms prior to interacting with one
another. It was common for the first messages from members to involve the suggestion
of a norm as opposed to the discussion of the group’s identity or discussion of the
upcoming game. Some groups continued to experience the rest of the stages as they
worked through the game while others took a much less structured approach and instead
engaged in a process more akin to the unordered tracks of the multiple sequences model.
What was evident, however, was that groups began with the norming-forming stages
before branching out into different pathways.
Groups also demonstrated clear progression through the tracks described in the
multiple sequences model (Poole, 1983) as they collectively worked through the task of
each round in the game and then encountered a breakpoint after tallying scores at the end
of each round. Members confronted the decisions they made, in some cases cooperation
and in others betrayals, and revised how they intended to approach the next round of the
game. From a theoretical perspective, the clear adherence to aspects of both the multiple
sequences (Poole, 1983) and Tuckman’s (1965) models demonstrated that self-referential
discussion groups shared features with more commonly studied counterparts in alternate
contexts and formation conditions.
In sum, social identity formation not only occurred, it brought forth a variety of
behaviors from the groups that carried distinct features of both deductive and inductive
groups. Further, formation generated a process of identity creation similar to the shared
fantasy described in symbolic convergence theory (Bormann, 1972), prompted
progression through stages of group development phase models, and upheld the finding
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that group formation occurs even with unclear social identities (Postmes, Haslam, &
Swaab, 2005) while extending this research into the CMC context.
Does social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to a salient
heterogeneous social identity?

Results indicated that self-referential discussion did not lead to a salient
heterogeneous social identity. The design of the experiment (as well as theoretical
boundaries) precluded the simultaneous salience of heterogeneous and homogeneous
identity. It was expected then, that either research question 2 or 3 must be negative.
Heterogeneous social identity reflects the approach of groups as a collection of
interpersonal relationships. The focus remains on the individual both from a salient
identity standpoint and as the focal point of study. However, for most of the
interpersonal theories the creation and production of an overarching group identity is not
a metaphorical crossing of the Rubicon into gestalt territory. Instead, and what the results
here mirror, is the acknowledgement and reaffirmation that groups exist as interpersonal
relationships still give rise to a group and correspondingly markers of gestalt interaction
alongside personal interaction. Postmes, Haslam, and Swaab (2005) make this point,
stating that most groups involve some degree of both homogeneous and heterogeneous
identity markers.
Implications for Groups as a Collection of Interpersonal Relationships.
Tellingly, groups did retain the influence of inductive formation. Many of the groups that
took a longer time to finish the experiment did so not because they were inefficient
communicators but because they temporarily set aside the task to get to know one another
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better. This carries the hallmarks of relational or expressive groups and the social
interactions they foster (Keyton, 2006). Further, as group members followed the prompt
to bring past experiences into the rule creation process (per Appendixes B and C) they
were capable of invoking the various theories of social influence. Participants used the
weapons of influence (Cialdini, 2016) to argue for or against a rule and discussed
attitudes of friends and acquaintances outside the group in the vein of social impact
theory (Latané, 1981). Throughout the experiment, discussion reflected the result of the
survey. Simply, the presence of a heterogeneous identity remained even as it took on less
importance than the homogenous identity. Ultimately, interpersonal interactions outside
the gestalt could and did occur within the groups.
Does social identity formation through self-referential discussion lead to a salient
homogeneous social identity?

Results indicated that self-referential discussion led to a salient homogeneous
social identity. As mentioned above, either research question two or three, both on the
subject of identity salience, were expected to have a negative answer. It was not,
however, a given that the other would have a positive answer. The resulting positive
answer indicated that a distinctly homogeneous social identity trend emerged among the
sample.
Implications for Groups as a Collection of Interpersonal Relationships.
Homogeneous identity indicated strong support for theories of social learning. While
symbolic convergence theory had the most impact on group formation, the process of
social comparison suggests that members would develop a relatively homogeneous
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concept of the group simply by comparing themselves to one another over time. This
result indicates that such a process was likely to have occurred in the groups during the
experiment because social comparison results in a high degree of awareness of member’s
similarities.
It is less of a clear indication that optimal distinctiveness was a feature of the
groups, however, as members had no outgroup to attempt to compare themselves against.
Notably though, members did invoke the specter of possible outgroups during discussion.
Suggested rules often accompanied stories of what bad group members did in the past.
The prompt indicated that members should bring forth personal experiences, but did not
specify that those experiences needed to be negative. Still, members who did bring up
experiences frequently followed them with rules designed to prevent something similar
from occurring. While outside the scope of the experiment, it is likely that this involved
the processes described in optimal distinctiveness theory as members sought to
distinguish themselves from these negative examples.
Perhaps the most compelling piece of evidence in favor of optimal
distinctiveness’ role is the simple fact that groups did not average an overwhelming
degree of similarity. Optimal distinctiveness posits that members will seek to find an
optimal level of difference from others, not so much that they belong to an outgroup but
not so little that they are lost in the crowd (Brewer, 1991). These results indicated that
just that occurred as members found a place of homogenous identity that helped them
become part of the in-group while retaining a level of autonomy and identity separate
from the gestalt.
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Implications for Gestalt Groups. These results indicated that a general
predisposition toward gestalt analysis given general questions regarding group behavior
is likely to be more useful than an interpersonal preference. While it is possible to
interpret the same results through the lens of a multitude of theories and theoretical
approaches, when looking to provide the most accurate view of the group theories that
lean toward the gestalt level of analysis will provide more information. The clear caveat
here is that depending on the objective of a study and the manipulation this may not be
true.
The Social Identity Approach In Situ. However, it is true that homogeneity
salience grants insight regarding the best method of examining groups in situ. As the
complexity of group formation increases, the applicability of gestalt methods of analysis
rises as well. The results also demonstrated that this is not a function exclusive to large
groups either. Not only was the formation mechanism notably more open-ended than
many other studies on small groups (see Forsyth, 2000; Forsyth & Burnette, 2005;
Laughlin, 2012), the groups in the experiment gravitated toward homogenous identity.
This indicates that formation through self-referential discussion, a process closer to the
complexities of real-world group creation than the comparatively simple process of
categorization, still lends itself well to gestalt group theories like those of the social
identity approach. This is consistent with prior findings on real-world identities using the
social identity approach (Reicher, 1984; Spears & Postmes, 2013; Drury & Reicher,
2005).
Ultimately, group members gravitated toward similarities rather than differences.
The perception of homogenous social identity indicates that when a clear social identity
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exists, it is likely to serve as the most effective measure of any individual group
member’s attitudes. In social identity terms, self-stereotyping is a particularly strong
force and the development of a prototypical identity may be the most important
identifying feature of the group.
Does deindividuation change the salience of social identity for CMC groups formed
using self-referential discussion?

The results demonstrated a clear change in the salience of social identity between
the CMC groups because of deindividuation. Deindividuation led to an increase of 0.791
in averaged scores for participants.
Implications for Groups as a Collection of Interpersonal Relationships. The
relatively small degree of change is notable from a relational group perspective. The
game participants played encourages some level of social conflict and unanimity among
group members. They had the option to cooperate with others or attempt to win the game
by themselves through defection from group tasks. Homogenous groups encourage
member unanimity (Jans et al., 2012) and while it is difficult to make a distinct
comparison without another experiment the small size of the shift prompts questions
regarding the interpersonal dynamics within the groups themselves. It is highly likely
that the groups did not experience a larger shift because the game encouraged a large
degree of interpersonal conflict and discussion. This suggests that even groups designed
in laboratory settings for the express purpose of analysis using gestalt theories can benefit
from the application of theories from the interpersonal lens. A complementary approach
is likely the most useful approach.
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This mirrors the typical approach taken by researchers looking to use uncertainty
reduction for the study of groups (Hogg & Tindale, 2008). Uncertainty reduction studies
present a unique opportunity to look at the effects of mixing theories for the purposes of
studying highly specific phenomena from multiple angles. While the focus of this paper
is not uncertainty reduction theory in particular, it does present a blueprint of successful
integration of theoretical approaches to examine in the future.
Implications for Gestalt Groups. No matter the size of the shift, the fact
remains that the increase in homogeneity salience did occur. Ultimately, the presence of
a change in identity salience alone indicates the utility of gestalt approaches. If a change
occurs between groups then analysis at the group level bent toward identifying and
observing that change is simply more effective than most interpersonal-centric
counterparts are because it will capture the essence of that change. The addition of the
direction, an increase, lends validity and credence to the social identity approach as well
as both of the two models utilized in the paper, SIDE and IMSIF.
The social identity model of deindividuation effects. The results were consistent
with SIDE. Deindividuation produced a shift in the salience of social identity, supporting
the main tenet of the model. This was evident by the presence of a clear, significant, and
directional difference between the control and deindividuation conditions.
Although not statistically significant, deindividuation also had a couple of
secondary effects consistent with SIDE as well. Deindividuation produced an increase in
the awareness of a social identity, evidenced by the results of the manipulation check.
Deindividuation also produced a smaller standard deviation for the deindividuation

80
condition compared to the control. This smaller standard deviation indicated a tighter
distribution of scores, consistent with a slightly more consolidated social identity.
Further, the cognitive deindividuation manipulation was a success. Anonymity
successfully served as the mechanism to enable deindividuation throughout the
experiment. The ability to produce deindividuation without the presence of an outgroup
was also notable as the creation of novel groups without predefined identity traits in the
experiment meant that any kind of strategic deindividuation manipulation was simply not
possible. It was impossible to invoke an outgroup when the in-group was unclearly
defined prior to the experiment. As a result, it was clear that anonymity alone succeeded
as a cognitive deindividuation manipulation and that cognitive manipulations alone were
responsible for the results of the experiment.
The clearest implication of this result is that deindividuation was a functional
manipulation as described in SIDE and not classic deindividuation theory. The increase
in identity salience confirmed the widespread finding that classic deindividuation theory
is incorrect (Villanova et al., 2017) and that deindividuation accentuates the salience of
group features already present (Tanis & Postmes, 2007; Wang, 2007). It also reinforces
the validity of SIDE for the same reason (Reicher et al., 1995).
Interactive model of social identity formation. The results were consistent with
IMSIF as well. Both control and deindividuation conditions were capable of producing
groups with a social identity, per the manipulation check. Additionally, every group
passed the manipulation check regardless of the saliency of either heterogeneous or
homogenous social identity, consistent with the prediction that either formation style
could result in the creation of a group identity. Generally, interaction provided the basis
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of strong group formation even when members were aware of intragroup differences.
Further, gestalt group formation occurred alongside the expected minimization of
intragroup differences and accompanying maximization of intragroup similarities.
This experiment also demonstrated IMSIFs assertion that no group is entirely
either deductive or inductive (Postmes, Haslam, & Swaab, 2005). Groups differed on the
extent of perceived identity homogeneity, and notably deindividuation did not push the
average score above the low six on the Likert scale. The most compelling piece of
evidence in support of this position however, was the size of the change in identity
salience. The change was not large, indicating that deindividuation was unable to
subsume entirely the heterogeneous aspect of the group.
Theoretical Implications

The results accomplished what this paper set out to do, provide a careful first step
on the road to mapping certain features of groups useful to identify which theory or
theories would best describe them. As mentioned in the literature review, this is by no
means definitive. The specific purpose was to help distinguish between potential fit for
theories belonging to the two overarching traditions associated with group theory. Not,
however, to provide a guide to any specific theory as the answer to that question rests on
the aims of the specific study and research question at hand.
What these results do suggest is simply that in states of equilibrium, individuals
within a group will tend to cling to gestalt signifiers of group identity over individual
markers. As a result, it typically will be more accurate to examine a group in terms of
homogenous features over heterogeneous features. Even the results of this experiment do
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not support a universal assertion of one over the other. Participants demonstrated a
perceptual preference for homogeneous group identity, but not to the exclusion of
individual identity.
Applied Implications

From a theoretical standpoint, the present study offers insight as to the
applicability and utility of various theories relevant to the study of groups. But perhaps
more useful is the practical applications of the present study to less theoretical and more
grounded contexts. When researchers do not have access to data regarding group
formation, it becomes difficult to apply certain theories. The present study offers a
method around that complication in CMC groups. By studying the identity salience of
the group, researchers can glean information about the genesis of a particular group.
Of course, this kind of issue is almost exclusively going to occur outside the
laboratory. Indeed, real world groups often present a unique challenge to researchers
because they not only provide too much information to allow for easy study but
information prior to a study is somewhat inaccessible. Using the present findings as a
guide, researchers can not only narrow down the appropriate theory for a given group but
also circumvent the need to track down old information on the group.
In Live Contexts. Groups come in a wide range of conditions and contexts.
Perhaps the most pertinent finding of the present research is less to do with the
application of theory and more so the observation that when group formation is less
structured, a wider range of possibilities occurs. Groups take different routes to reach the

83
same destinations with members taking longer or shorter time frames, tracks, and
developing wildly different norms all while coalescing into highly salient groups.
For example, when confronted with the challenge of setting a batting order two
baseball teams might approach the problem in different ways, both reflective of their
formation and resulting identity. The team built of individual players and highly salient
of group heterogeneity would seek to maximize each person’s individual skillset, pairing
a strong base runner with a batter capable of consistently fouling to create opportunities.
In contrast, the homogeneous team formed around a gestalt identity would try to
maximize the overall success of the roster, emphasizing a traditional batting order aimed
toward encouraging players to fulfil certain roles such as that of the cleanup hitter.
The resulting rosters might appear identical. The strongest hitter on both teams is
likely to appear in the same spot on the roster for different reasons, in the heterogeneous
group batting cleanup because he or she thrives on batting with runners on base while in
the homogeneous group he or she represents the best opportunity to provide points
batting in that role. The result in both cases is the same. But as the groups progress
toward identical conclusions they trace different pathways.
Where researchers need to be wary is situations when the result of these different
pathways is a different endpoint. Perhaps a team decides that all cleanup hitters must
play first base and as a result wastes the talents of superb outfielder. Alternatively, a
player recognizes his individual strength is batting and neglects to practice his defense,
hurting the team as a result. The consequences of an improperly utilized player for the
baseball team are hardly that drastic (except for the fans), but it is simple to imagine other
groups where the consequences are much greater than a lost game. In those groups,

84
rapidly developing awareness of the group’s specific identity could be the difference
between averting a catastrophe or suffering through one.
Limitations

This study’s limitations primarily were confined to the limited nature of the
experiment and features of the sample itself that created weaknesses in the data analysis.
This section provides an overview of those limitations.
Generalizability. The present study has limitations in regards to the
generalizability of the findings. These limitations stem from the scope and interaction
time of the experiment.
Scope. The scope of the study is narrow. Based on these, results it is impossible
to definitely state that group formation under other conditions would behave the same
because deindividuation as a manipulation becomes much less predictable when
introduced outside of CMC contexts. For example, inducing deindividuation using
concealing robes and hoods also could invoke the specter of the Ku Klux Klan as in
Reicher’s (1982) original study on the subject. Other potential means of inducing
deindividuation also invite complications of this sort rendering this sort of simulated
environment difficult to cleanly replicate offline using the same kind of anonymityinduced deindividuation as the manipulation. That aside, if the potential complication is
insignificant or contextually negligible then these results will transfer to offline settings.
Interaction Time. The interaction time in this experiment was limited.
Participants met, formed groups, and adjourned after the experiment in sessions that were
less than a day. Potentially different results could occur if groups took more time to bond
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and interact. This might have led to the creation of more rules or a stronger social
identity. It could also have had the opposite effect. Group members might have
discovered upon further interaction more about other participants that would lead them to
focus on salient differences as opposed to salient commonalities. Without a longer study,
it is not possible to generalize these results to long-term groups.
Data Analysis. This study did have some clear limits with regards to data
analysis. Because of the focused and relatively simple nature of the analysis, these limits
were primarily restricted to logistical concerns.
Manipulation Check. Notably, both conditions experienced a salient social
identity, but in this study, the deindividuation formation manipulation increased the
salience of social identity relative to the control. In this case, the salience of that social
identity is the dependent variable, salience of homogeneity, and not the check of group
formation itself. Potentially this demonstrates that social identity formation was simply
more prone to occurring in the deindividuation condition. Critically, however, the results
did demonstrate that social identity forms in both conditions.
Further, the difference between the two conditions was not significant (p < .066).
It was close enough, however, that with more participants or clearer data that ambiguity
could be clarified. Though the difference was nearly significant, it was also a weak shift.
The increase was 0.7 and while it is enough to raise interest and ideally prompt future
study, is not cause for alarm concerning the rest of the dataset.
Future Directions
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This experiment offers a preliminary look at a narrow range of groups. Groups
with more extensive history, less controlled formation, larger and more or less defined
sets of rules all present potential complications to blindly asserting the utility of this
experiment as a guidepost for the application of theory to real life. While it is possible to
alleviate this problem with additional testing of different conditions the truth is that
searching for such a guide is probably futile. The far more practical exercise is to
identify features of groups that can serve as important markers to aid in the application of
theory. In that, the present experiment demonstrates that prioritizing examination of
group level features is likely to bear more practical applications than prioritizing the
individual will.
Longitudinal Studies. As noted in the limitations section, this study cannot
demonstrate the persistence of these effects over time. A longitudinal study observing
groups formed under similar conditions, could. Similar to Postmes, Spears, and Lea’s
(2002) work on anonymity the method of interaction could expand from a simple game to
a more goal-oriented effort that would increase the incentive for groups to cooperate.
This would not only be necessary for the prevention of significant attrition throughout the
course of the experiment but could serve as an easier way to foster continued interaction
between group members.
Expanded Contexts. Future inquiry ought to include expansion of the contextual
factors that went into the creation of the group. Not only is it important to help validate
these results in a variety of contexts, but the identification of other significant factors
influencing group creation is vital to understanding the underlying mechanics themselves.
Just as deindividuation behaves differently as a manipulation depending on the context
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(Reicher, et al. 1995) other factors influencing group creation may behave differently
depending on group construction. Identifying these factors, or lack thereof, is one future
direction for studies utilizing a variety of contextual differences in the creation of small
groups.
Existing Groups. Many of the most important groups to study are those that
already exist. Researchers looking to gain a better understanding of the workplace,
family, or (returning to the example from the beginning) a professional baseball team
have a unique opportunity to examine the mechanisms of group formation in situ. As
teams form, evolve, and dissolve within these organizations and social contexts the value
of understanding how persistent group formation effects are increases.
Do members with prior history have a keener understanding of in-group
differences or similarities? Does a newly salient identity trump the effects of prior
interaction? Do new members take on the same perception of identity as existing
members for heterogeneous and homogeneous identities? Will self-referential discussion
perform the same when members have prior history with one another? All of these are
potential questions to expand this research into the most important context, live situations
and real world groups.
Conclusion

Returning to the example used throughout this paper, this study demonstrates an
important facet of our hypothetical baseball team. First, no team forms entirely around
one tradition. Any style of formation naturally includes elements of the other. The team
that builds around the identity of the Yankees probably does not include a Babe Ruth, and
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so must compensate by bringing forth the talents of the players they do have. That said,
even while playing as the Yankees, group members will find ways to express individual
traits. This is true even if expressing those traits means picking a famous player with a
similar style and emphasizing similarities between the legend and the group member.
Second, groups and teams lean toward homogenous identity traits in an
equilibrium. For a pickup game of baseball, a team is likely to coalesce toward the idea
of playing like the Yankees if they have the opportunity to do both that or form around
their individual traits. Even as players express individual skills and traits they are
inclined to do so using the vehicle of the team and the shared language of a particularly
admired player, manager, or moment from within the cultural identity of the team.
The beginning of this paper laid out the importance of studying groups and
particularly the social identities that form within those groups. It did so primarily by
looking at the past, but it is evident that groups will continue to play a large role in our
collective future as well. That future demands stewardship. It demands understanding.
It demands not only the continuous growth of scholarship within the field, but also the
continuous refinement of that scholarship. Researchers across disciplinary lines rose to
these demands admirably by creating the wealth of theory discussed above and applying
it across a wide range of contexts, disciplines, and subjects. In doing so, they blessed the
field with a set of tools that offer numerous means of studying groups.
Tools, however, are as useful as the hands that wield them. If we intend to extract
the maximum utility from future work, then researchers need to understand when and
why to apply these theories. This paper helps provide a means of doing just that, giving
researchers another means to help apply theory in an efficient and effective manner.
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Appendix A
Text for recruitment message posted to Facebook:

Hello everyone,

I am recruiting participants for a thesis researching small group formation. Participation
in this study will entail completion of the attached survey, participation in an online
group for approximately thirty minutes, and completion of another survey. If you are
interested and aged 18 or over, please complete the attached survey. Thank you!
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Appendix B
Please select a color from the following options:
1. Blue
2. Red
3. Green
4. Yellow
Please select a color from the following options:
1. Purple
2. Orange
3. Brown
4. Pink
Please select a color from the following options:
1. Violet
2. Teal
3. Black
4. White
Please select a color from the following options:
1. Silver
2. Gold
3. Grey
4. Indigo
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Appendix C
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. This study is an examination
of group bonding. You will be sorted into groups based on your color preferences,
although it is unlikely that every member of the group gave the same answer to each
question.
Once in your group, please engage in a discussion of the guidelines, traits, and
ideals you would like your group to follow along with your fellow members. As you do
so, please maintain a civil and respectful discussion. Keep in mind that the manner in
which you discuss and resolve these issues is also likely to become the standard way your
group discusses other issues. At the end of this discussion, your group needs to come up
with a minimum of three rules for members to follow. You may have more than three
rules. There is also no restriction or emphasis on what rules you devise.
However, it is important that as you discuss these guidelines, traits, and ideals you
consider and involve your individual experiences. Groups bond best when members feel
comfortable expressing their individuality.
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Appendix D
Stag Hunt
Your group will now participate in a game. The winner of the game is the player
with the most points after the last of four rounds. In the event of a tie, multiple players
win.
Each player will secretly receive an identity via private message indicating your
in-game identity as Player A, B, or C. Note that the order is random and does not
correspond to member’s identities. Once you receive your in-game identity, please read
the following instructions.
You are a group of hunters tracking a stag in the woods. However, hunting a stag
is difficult work and requires the cooperation of your entire group. If all players decide
to hunt the stag you will all receive three points. But you can only catch the stag if
everyone participates, if less than three players hunt the stag then the stag escapes and
everyone who attempted to hunt the stag will receive nothing.
Fortunately, the woods are also full of rabbits. Rabbits are worth one point. But
rabbits do not require as much work as the stag and any player can catch a rabbit alone.
If you choose to pursue the rabbit, you will receive one point no matter what any other
players decide. Regardless of other player’s decisions, anyone who decides to hunt a
rabbit will receive one point.
Each hunter decides what game to pursue individually and in secret. Once each
hunter decides, everyone will submits his or her decisions secretly. After everyone
submits his or her decision, all players reveal their decisions and receive the rewards for
any successful hunt(s).
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Throughout the game, and before you make a final decision, you may engage in
discussion with your fellow group members.
Appendix E
Thank you for agreeing to participate in this study. This study is an examination
of group bonding. You will be sorted into groups based on your color preferences,
although it is unlikely that every member of the group gave the same answer to each
question.
Once in your group, please engage in a discussion of the guidelines, traits, and
ideals you would like your group to follow along with your fellow members. As you do
so, please maintain a civil and respectful discussion. Keep in mind that the manner in
which you discuss and resolve these issues is also likely to become the standard way your
group discusses and resolves other issues. At the end of this discussion, your group
needs to come up with a minimum of three rules for members to follow. You may have
more than three rules. During the game, your identities will be obscured and players will
be anonymous. As a result, while you are free to devise any rules you deem appropriate,
you may not impose rules that require members to reveal their identities publicly. You
may also wish to consider that players will be anonymous when creating rules, as this
may prevent you from enforcing rules.
However, it is important that as you discuss these guidelines, traits, and ideals you
consider and involve your individual experiences. Groups bond best when members feel
comfortable expressing their individuality.
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Appendix F
Stag Hunt
Your group will now participate in a game. The winner of the game is the player
with the most points after the last of four rounds. In the event of a tie, multiple players
win.
Each player will secretly receive an identity via private message indicating your
in-game identity as Player A, B, or C. Note that the order is random and does not
correspond to member’s identities. Once you receive your in-game identity, please read
the following instructions.
You are a group of hunters tracking a stag in the woods. However, hunting a stag
is difficult work and requires the cooperation of your entire group. If all players decide
to hunt the stag you will all receive three points. But you can only catch the stag if
everyone participates, if less than three players hunt the stag then the stag escapes and
everyone who attempted to hunt the stag will receive zero points.
Fortunately, the woods are also full of rabbits. Rabbits are worth one point. But
rabbits do not require as much work as the stag and any player can catch a rabbit alone.
If you choose to pursue the rabbit, you will receive one point no matter what any other
players decide. Regardless of other player’s decisions, anyone who decides to hunt a
rabbit will receive one point.
Each hunter decides what game to pursue individually and in secret. Once each
hunter decides, everyone will submits his or her decisions secretly. After everyone
submits his or her decision, all players reveal their decisions and receive the rewards for
any successful hunt(s).
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Throughout the game, you may engage in discussion with your fellow group
members through the chat box.
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Appendix G
Please complete the following survey by circling a number below each question.
1. I have a lot in common with the average person in my group.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
2. There are positive relationships among the group members.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
3. I do not feel a part of the group’s activities.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

Agree
4. Problem solving processes would be disrupted if one or two members are absent.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
5. The group members feel comfortable in expressing disagreements in the group.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
6. I am similar to the average person in my group.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

Agree
7. The group members seem to be aware of the group’s unspoken rules.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

Agree
8. In my group people have a lot in common with one each other.

7

Strongly
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Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
9. In spite of individual differences, a feeling of unity exists in my group.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

6

7

Strongly

6

7

Strongly

Agree
10. It appears that the individual and group goals are inconsistent.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
11. People in my group are very similar to each other.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

Agree
12. Minimal attempts are made to include quieter members of this group.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
13. There is a feeling of unity and togetherness among group members.
Strongly disagree

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

2

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

3

4

5

6

7

Strongly

Agree
14. I identify with my group.
Strongly disagree

1

Agree
15. I feel included in the group.
Strongly disagree
Agree

1

2

